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Completing the International Gold Standard
Facade, 1925-1928CHAPTER 14
The Substantial Completion of the International Gold
Standard Facade outside the Central Nucleus
The currency history of 1925 tO 1928 was exceedingly com-
plex, for it was dominated by the mutual impact of three
major and simultaneous lines of development:
i)the return of many countries, of which France was the most
important, to the gold standard
2)the consolidation of their positions within the gold standard
system by many countries, of which Germany was the most im-
portant
the operation of a wide-spread international gold standard
system with New York and London as major centers.
Only after examining each development separately can the
grand lines of the international gold standard system as a
whole as it stood in 1928—29—the only year from 1914 to the
date of writing in which it was substantially complete—be
made clear and definite.
Growth of the Gold Standard Area, 1925—1928
The Position at the Close of 1925
increase in exchange stability of 1924 was continued in
1925. In its Memorandum on Currency and Central Banks
the League of Nations presented a list of 48 countries grouped
according to the status of their currencies with respect to sta-
bilization at the end of 1925. Of these 48 currencies 29 had
by then returned to their pre-war pars, or been devalued,
•or had been stabilized de facto for one year. In this last
category the Memorandum includes only Honduras, Bul-
garia, Estonia, and Siam, but British India and Czechoslova-
kia should be added. The rupee had reached the level of 1 S.
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6 d. sterling in October 1924, which at that time was the
equivalent of i s. 4 d. gold. When the pound reached itspre-
war parity with the dollar, the 1 5. 6 d. level in sterling became
also a is. 6 d. level in gold. The rupee rate was prevented
from rising higher by the government which, as currency
authority, freely purchased sterling at 1S. 63/io d.; and was
prevented from falling lower because, after April 1926, the
government authorized the Imperial Bank to make offers on
its behalf to sell sterling at i S. 53/4 d.' The Czechoslovak cur-
rency was stabilized de facto at just under 3 cents to the crown
beginning in 1923, and held there by the operations of the
Banking Office of the Ministry of Finance.2
The addition of these two currencies to the list of the
Memorandum gives a total of 31. There was also the United
States dollar, not included in the list because it constituted
the central point of reference in the whole post-war stabiliza-
tion effort and was throughout the period of stabilization 'at
par with gold.' With the dollar should be linked the cur-
rencies of Cuba and the Philippine Islands, and somewhat
more loosely, Mexico. This brings the total to 35 countries.
These 35 countries composed a stable exchange area that
existed throughout 1925. The exchange rates of two groups
of countries that had been, or intended to become, gold stand-
ard countries were still fluctuating with reference to this area.
"In Denmark, Norway, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, Brazil and Bolivia, the instability of the currency
during 1925 took the form of a rapid appreciation in value.
But in Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, and Poland the ex-
ternal purchasing power of the currency was less at the end
of the year than at the beginning." The appreciation of the
1Reportof the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance (1926),
Cmd. 2687, pp. 4—5.
2Thissystem of pegging was introduced after a period of rapid appreciation
and was carried out with the aid of foreign credits. It was accompanied by a
deflationary crisis. D. T. Jack, The Restoration of European Currencies (Lon-
don, King, 1927), pp.162—4.
League of Nations, Memorandum on Currency and Central Banks, 1913—
1925 (Geneva,1926), I, 7.COMPLETING THE FACADE 395
three exchanges—of Yugoslavia, Bolivia, and Denmark—
brought these currencies to levels at which de facto stabiliza-
tion was begun during 1925. The Yugoslav dinar was stabi-
lized de facto about June 1925 and this stabilization was
maintained by the intervention of the National Bank in the
exchange market in cooperation with the Ministry of Fi-
nance.4 The Boliviano was stabilized de facto in January 1926,
and the Danish krone in March In addition, the Uru-
guayan peso, which had appreciated rapidly throughout 1924,
reachedcents to the peso in August 1925, and was iot.6
cents in December 1925. In February 1926 the average rate
on New York was 103.1, just under par, 103.42.
With the further addition of these 4 currencies, therefore,
the system of stable exchange rates existing early in
comprised 39 countries:
Europe: (17)• UnitedKingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Switz-
erland, Germany, Danzig, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Finland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, Russia
North America (2)UnitedStates, Canada
South and CentralChile, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Nicaragua,
America (12) Salvador,Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Cuba, Mexico
Africa (2) Egypt,Union of South Africa
Asia British India, Siam
Oceania Dutch East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, Philippine
Islands
Naticnal Bank of Yugoslavia Annual Reports for 1927and1928(Federal
Reserve Bulletin, June 1928, p. 409, and July 1929, p. 497). The date of
stabili,:ation is taken from the tables of exchange rates published in the
Bulletin, January 1928, pp. 57—62.
8"Fiscalreform began in Denmark at the end of 1923. Two foreign loans
were raised, one in London and one in New York to constitute an 'Exchange
Equalization Fund.' A period of exchange stability followed, but it was in-
tended that there should be a gradual appreciation of the krone until the
pre-war parity was restored. In February 1924theexchange was put under
the management of a specially organized Valuta Control. A special commission
then ccnsidered and rejected proposals for devaluation, and reported in favor
of a return to the old parity. The National Bank was then given the proceeds
of a $io million state guaranteed loan and directed to maintain rates on a
progressively rising scale. Speculation induced by this plan brought the ex-
change up from 66% of the old parity in December 1924to of that
parity in June 1926."(Jack, op. cit., pp. 74—5). By March 1926 the average
rate on New York was 26.1, par being 26.8 cents to the krone. This apprecia-
tion was accompanied by deflationary pressure on the Danish economy.396 EXPERIMENTATION
De Facto and De Jure Stabilizations, 1926—1928
Most of the countries that were members of this group by
virtue of de facto stabilizations either adhered to the gold
standard de jure in some form or bound themselves by law
to continue the de facto stabilizations in anticipation of a
later de jure return to gold during 1926—28. Finland returned
to gold de jure on December 31, 1925, Chile on January ii,
1926, Canada on July 1, 1926, Denmark on January i, 1927,
and Estonia on January i,1928.°On April i,1926the Na-
°Finland. The Finnish mark was devalued and a new standard unit fixed on
the basis of 29.70marksto the dollar, the rate at which the mark had been
de facto stabilized since the last quarter of 1924. The central bank, which
had accumulated large foreign exchange holdings and whose gold holdings
were automatically increased in nominal value by the devaluation, was placed
under obligation to redeem its notes in gold or gold exchange. Gold was not
returned to circulation. Jack, cit., pp. 200—4.
Chile. The Chilean stabilization was carried out on the basis of recommenda-
tions made by the Kemmerer Commission of Experts. A new central bank,
the Banco Central de Chile, was organized and began operations on January
11,1926.On that date the peso was devalued and a new standard equal to
one-third its former parity, or 6 d. as compared to i8 d., was introduced, and
the new central bank was placed under obligation to redeem its notes in gold
or gold exchange. The Banco Central was modeled on the Federal Reserve
system of the United States. Its stock was owned by member banks, including
foreign banks operating in Chile. It was required to keep a reserve of 50 per
cent of its combined note and deposit liability in gold or in deposits abroad
in banks of high standing. League of Nations, Legislation on Cold, 1930,pp.
59—60.
Canada. The Canadian dollar had been practically at par with the American
dollar since the middle of 1924, and by agreement sufficient gold was allowed
to flow between New York and Canada to prevent any large movement in the
exchange. Under the Finance Act of 1923 the suspension of gold redemption
authorized by the Finance Act of 1914wascontinued, bank notes were made
legal tender, and control of gold exports was vested in the government. These
provisions of the Act, however, expired by limitation on July i,1926,and
the de jure return of Canada to the gold standard was accomplished on that
date by allowing them to lapse.
The circumstances favorable, to a return to the gold standard by Canada
are summarized by the Federal Reserve Bulletin in its issue of July 1926
(p. 534):
"Among the principal factors facilitating Canada's return to the gold stand-
ard have been the growing favorable balance on external trade account, to-COMPLETING THE FACADE 397
tional Bank of Czechoslovakia was placed under legal obli-
gation. to keep the relation of the crown to undepreciated
foreign currencies at the level of the preceding two years.7
The National Bank olE Bulgaria was given on January i, 1927
the duty of maintaining the gold value of its notes unim-
gether with a decline in the net trade balance due the United States; the
liquidation of British indebtedness to Canada; the restoration of the pound
sterling and other foreign currencies to a gold basis; the resumption of cash
or short-term payments in international trade; the complete funding of the
national debt, the major portion of which is internal; the increasing Ameri-
can and foreign investments in Canada; the rise in other 'invisible' items in
her balance of payments, notably tourist expenditures; and the continuçd
in the annual gold production."
Denmark. On January i, 1927 the exemption granted to the National Bank
of Copenhagen from its obligation to redeem its notes in gold expired by
statutory limitation. A gold bullion standard modeled upon that of Great
Britain was adopted in spite of a strong sentiment in Denmark in favor of a
return to the full gold standard (Jack, op. cit., pp. 74-5). The influence of
the Bank of England was probably exerted to achieve this form of gold
economy in Denmark.
Estonia. In the middle of 1924 an effort was made to stabilize the Estonian
currency on the Swedish krona. After the return of England to the gold
standard stabilization was continued on the basis of marks to the dollar
and i8oo marks to the pound. A currency and banking reform was legalized
by the Act of April i, 1927 and was put into effect on January 1, 1928. A new
unit of account was introduced and a foreign loan was raised to carry through
the stabilization by the League of Nations, which appointed a Financial Ad-
visor. The Eesti Pank was placed under obligation to give official notice of
at least one foreign gold currency in which it would redeem its notes. It
gave notice on January 2, 1928 that that currency would be sterling. ibid.,
pp. 197—9.
The National Bank of Czechoslovakia was organized and put into operation
on AFril 1, 1926. It was permitted to keep 75 per cent of its reserve in gold
andper cent in foreign exchange, and was obligated to maintain the crown
at between 2.90 and 3.o3 dollars to ion crowns. This involved a change in law
but not in substance in the currency condition of the country, for the Bank
took over the exchange operations of the Banking Office of the Ministry of
Finance. In order to facilitate the pegging of the exchange the government
was authorized to raise a loan of $50 million or its equivalent in sterling; and
in the spring of 1926 revolving credits of this amount were obtained. The
notes of the Bank remained inconvertible. On January i, 1929 control of the
foreign exchanges was removed and the Bank of Issue moved into a period
of de facto conversion of its notes into the exchanges of gold standard coun-
tries. This further step in the process of returning to the gold standard wasEXPERIMENTATION
paired by all means in its power.8 In India the agitation for
a depreciation of the rupee to iS. 4 d. was stopped by the
Indian Currency Act of 1927, which placed upon the govern-
ment the obligation to buy gold and to sell gold or sterling
at prices that continued de jure the de facto stabilization al-
ready in effect.9
These various legal measures were of great importance in
establishing the basis upon which it was hoped to operate the
international gold standard in countries outside the central
nucleus. They applied the principle of the independent cen-
tral bank and illustrated the work of the new agencies of
cooperation—inter-central bank cooperation, the money doc-
tors, and the Financial Section of the League of Nations.
They illustrated the development of the gold bullion and
gold exchange standard as instruments of gold economy and
gave rise to the accumulation and use of large foreign ex-
change balances by central banks in the central money mar-
kets. In several cases they put an end to the double accounting
long practiced with reference to gold in the balance sheets of
central banks. They did not greatly influence the course of
the exchanges, as they were almost all preceded by periods of
de facto stabilization of varying duration. At the beginning
directly influenced by the Italian and French stabilizations. On November 7,
1929 the de facto gold exchange standard waslegalizedby a decree which
went into effect on November 27. The Bank reserves were legally established
at 25 per cent, to be raised later toper cent, and in 1935 toper cent,
against notes and deposits, of which one-half might be in foreign exchange.
League of Nations, Legislation on Gold, 1930, pp. 209—10.
8 National Bank of Bulgaria was reorganized by law of November
i,1927, as one of the preliminary conditions laid down
by the League of Nations for arranging a refugee loan. Its main task was to
maintain the stability of the leva at .72 cents per leva, a point at which it had
been stable for about four years. The reserves of the Bank were fixed at
per cent, to be increased later to 40 per cent, either in gold or in foreign
exchange. The Bank was greatly aided in carrying out its main functions by
the inflow of foreign funds into Bulgaria based on confidence inspired by the
refugee loan. Ibid., pp. 178—9.
9 For the terms of this Act, cf. Ch. 23, The Influence of World.wide Deflation-
ary Forces on Indian Demand for Gold and Silver.COMPLETING THE FACADE 399
of 1926, however, 15countriesstill had to carry out de facto
stabilitation operations preparatory to their return to the
gold standard system:
]Lurope (g) Poland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Norway, Greece, Portugal,
Roumania, France
South America Argentina, Paraguay (since z 923peggedto the Argentine
peso), Brazil, Ecuador, Peru
Asia (z) Japan
By the end of 1928 this task was largely accomplished. De
facto stabilization was achieved in 1926 in Italy, Poland, Bel-
gium, and France; in 1927 in Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Para-
guay, and Ecuador; and in 1928 in Norway and Peru. In
most instances, de jure stabilization followed before the end
of 1928.
Italy stabilized de facto in August 1926 and de jure in De-
cember 1927. Poland, the only country that, after a de jure
stabilization, was forced by a renewed depreciation of its cur-
rency to abandon the gold standard after 1925, carried out a
second de facto stabilization in the autumn of 1926, followed
by a second de jure return to gold on a new basis on October
:t3, 1927. In this she was aided by credits obtained from a
group of 14 central banks—a high point in post-war inter-
central. bank cooperation.'° Belgium attempted unsuccessfully
1O The first Polish stabilization was accomplished Ifl 1924 by a banking re-
Ibrm ca:rried out with the aid of foreign credits and by the introduction of
a new currency, the zloty. This new unit, on the advice of Hilton Young,
was made the equivalent of the French gold franc. A new central bank was
cstablished, and the governments power to borrow from it was limited to 50
millionzloty. The government, however, was permitted to continue to pro-
vide metallic currency and to issue notes up to 50 million zloty. In addition,
another state bank, the Bank Gospodarstvo Kragowego, held part of the
state funds and was able to pursue an independent credit policy. In spite of
these limitations on its power, the new central bank was able to maintain the
new parity of 25.2215 to the dollar during the rest of 1924. But by August
the government had exhausted its power to borrow and had rapidly increased
its own note issue. On November 28,1924it got parliamentary authority to
increase the fiduciary issue 50 million zloty, on condition of raising a loan of
double that amount. Bank of Poland notes were rapidly reduced by being
converted into foreign exchange, and were replaced by state notes. The in-
ternal circulation rose rapidly, and prices also rose. During 1924 an un-400 EXPERIMENTATION
to stabilize de jure in March 1926, after a de facto stabiliza-
tion at 107 francs to the pound which had lasted six months,
and stabilized successfully de facto and de jure at 175 francs
to the pound in October 1926. The French franc was stabi-
lized de facto in December 1926 and de jure in June 1928.
From the beginning of 1927 the Greek drachma was stabilized
with only a minimum of fluctuation, and on May 14, 1928
it was officially devalued and a gold exchange standard intro-
duced. This reform was carried out under the auspices of the
League of Nations, and involved the setting up of a new cen-
tral bank whose constitution embodied the best expression of
post-war experience in central banking principles. The Bra-
zilian milreis was stabilized de facto in January 1927, follow-
ing the Law of December i8, 1926 which set up a stabilization
Bureau pending a definite return to gold.1' The Argentine
favorable balance of trade was offset by large foreign credits, but many of
these were short term. With the internal inflation, the foreign exchange and
metallic reserves of the bank of Poland began to decline in spite of 123
million zloty made available to it from the proceeds of a government loan
placed in New York. At the end of July 1925 pegging was abandoned and
the zloty began to depreciate. There was a severe crisis in August and foreign
balances were rapidly withdrawn. The zloty fell to 48 per cent of its 1924
parity with the dollar. Alter a sharp recovery early in 1926 it reached a new
low in May. The gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Poland
had been practically exhausted by the end of 1925, but when in 1926 inflation
was stopped, the zloty again began to appreciate and gold and foreign ex-
change holdings were reconstituted. Following the recommendations of the
Keminerer Commission the zloty was stabilized de facto at dose to ii cents
in the summer of 1926, and de jure stabilization followed at 11.22 cents per
zloty on October 13, 1927. A foreign financial advisor to the government and
to the Bank of Poland was appointed and an international loan of $72 million
was floated in the principal money markets of the world. In addition, a credit
of $14 million was extended to the Bank of Poland by a group of 14 central
banks under the leadership of the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Internal banking reform was completed by giving to the
Bank of Poland a monopoly of note issue. A reserve of 40 per cent in gold
and foreign exchange was established against note and sight liabilities, of
which 75 per cent, or 30 per cent of notes and sight liabilities, must be in
gold. The government budget was balanced and final unification of the cur-
rency completed. Jack, op. cit., pp. 179—80.
This office was authorized to exchange notes for gold and gold for notes at
the fixed rate of milligrams of gold 94.o fine per milreis. Provision was
made for the accumulation of resources to carry out this function, and theCOMPLETING THE FACADE 401
peso, which had appreciated rapidly throughout 1924, stood
at the end of 1925 at a discount of only 2 per cent from its
pre-war parity. It declined several points in the spring of 1926,
but appreciated steadily thereafter, reaching parity in June
1927. 'On August 27, 1927 the Caja de Conversion was opened,
and this constituted the official Argentine return to gold.
With the Argentine peso the Paraguayan peso joined the
stable exchange area. On August 10, 1927 Ecuador reorgan-
ized its currency in accordance with a plan recommended by
the K.emmerer Commission, and set up a new central bank
which was obligated to redeem its notes in gold or gold ex-
change. The Norwegian krone reached its pre-war parity in
New York in May 1928, and on May i Norway returned to
the gold standard at the old par.12 Finally in May 1928 de
facto stabilization was achieved in Peru attothe Peruvian
pound.18
Executive was authorized to purchase and sell foreign exchange at the rates
established by the new parity, entrusting such portions of this duty as could
not be performed by the Caixa to the Bank of Brazil. These measures intro-
duced a third note issue into the currency system of Brazil, in addition to the
notes of the Treasury and those of the Bank of Brazil, pending such time as
all the paper money of the country should be convertible into gold. This con-
version was required by the Law of December iS, 1926, but was to go into
effect upon a date to be fixed by executive decree. For the text of the law
and other material bearing upon this stabilization cf. Bank of London and
South America, Monthly Review, Feb. 1927.
12 The Norwegian crown had depreciated in New York almost continuously
from 1922 to 1925 but during 1925 and 1926 it appreciated rapidly and
continuously. By the end of 1925 the krone had risen to 75 per cent of its
former parity. A special Commission reported in June 1926 in favor of stab-
ilization at the rate then prevailing—about 82 per cent of the old parity—
I)uttFLispolicy was not carried out, and after three months of stability ap-
preciation was resumed. In December 1926 a level oFper cent of the old
parity was reached. In February 1927 the krone stood at gO per cent of parity
and was finally stabilized at par in May 1928. As in Denmark the steady
appreciation of the currency produced deflationary pressure in the country
during 1926. Jack, op. cit., pp. 71—8.
13In])ecember 1927 a Peruvian loan ofmillion was floated in New York.
Part of the proceeds were assigned to serve as a gold exchange fund. After
March 1928 the exchange rate was held steady at The de facto stabiliza-
tion of May 1928 was followed on February 2, by a de jure stabilization
which established a new standard coin, the sol, with a par value of 40 cents,
and li.f ted the gold export embargo.402 EXPERIMENTATION
Unfinished Business, 1929
Bythe end of 1928, therefore, the international gold stand-
ard system was substantially completed. Only the de facto and
de jure stabilization of the exchanges of Spain, Portugal, and
Roumania in Europe, and of Japan in Asia, and the comple-
tion of the final steps in the de jure stabilization of Czecho-
slovakia, and de jure stabilization in Brazil, Uruguay, and
Peru remained as unfinished business in this great effort to
achieve permanent exchange stability. A vast area of stable
exchange rates was in existence, which, as long as it retained
its internal cohesion, would fluctuate as a whole with refer-
ence to the silver standard world—China, Persia, Abyssinia,
and certain other eastern countries. The process by which, for
a brief moment in post-war history, this great objective of
international financial statesmanship was achieved was one
that revealed the extremely diverse international financial re-
lationships included in the catholic term "return to gold." It
was also a process that increased the potential strains to which
the international gold standard system was subject both at its•
periphery and within its nucleus of center countries. These
two facts may be clearly seen by a brief examination of the
special relations of Russia, Argentina, and Japan to the gold
standard area, of certain aspects of the Belgian and Italian
stabilizations, and of the place of the French stabilization in
gold standard history.
The Special Relations of Russia, Argentina, and Japan
to the Gold Standard Area
Russia
Only by the widest license of expression could Russia be de-
scribed as a gold standard country, but after 1924 she was part
of the gold standard system of stable exchange rates. She used
gold as a balancing item in her balance of payments, as well
as an article of export from her own production, and was
aided by the stability of her exchanges in negotiating creditsCOMPLETING THE FACADE 403
in the central money markets. At times, in subsequent gold
standard history, thesç relationships of Russia to the gold
standard world became of major importance.'4 Some account
should therefore be given of the peculiar place of gold in the
Russian currency system.
Following a short period of effort to establish a moneyless
economy in 1921theNinth All-Russian Congress of Soviets
decided to introduce "a sound monetary system on a gold
basis" and placed upon the Commissariat of Finance the duty
of establishing such a system. In November 1921 an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made to restore the pre-war gold rouble.
The Soviet rouble was officially rated at 6o,ooo to one gold
rouble, but with the progress of inflation this index had to
be increased monthly. In March 1922 it had reached 200,000
Soviet roubles for one gold rouble, and the attempt to fix a
ratio then abandoned. In October 1921 a new State Bank
was founded and a year later was given the right to issue notes.
These notes were expressed in anew unit, the Tchervonetz,
the equivalent of io pre-war roubles, against which a reserve
of 25 per cent in gold, silver, platinum, or stable foreign cur-
rencies, and 75 per cent in liquid bills and in readily market-
able goods was to be maintained. Advances to the Commis-
sariat of Finance were not limited but were to be secured by
the precious metals up to 50 per cent. No ratio of exchange
between the Tchervonetz and the Soviet rouble was estab-
lished:, and for a while two paper currencies circulated side
by side, fluctuating in terms of each other. During 1923 the
Soviet rouble depreciated violently in terms of the Tcher-
vonetz. In October an effort was made to fix official rates of
conversion between the two units, but these could not keep
pace with the actual depreciation of the Soviet rouble. In
February 1924 the Commissariat of Finance was authorized
to issue notes of i, and5 rouble denominations to an
14 Cf. Ch. 25,TheGold and Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Reichsbank
during the Period of Chronic Emergency, March iggo to May 1931, and Ch.
32, The Place of Germany in the World of Gold.404 EXPERIMENTATION
amount of not over half the Tchervontzi in circulation. In
March 1924 Soviet rouble notes were demonetized, their is-
sue stopped, and a final rate of redemption of 50 billion Soviet
roubles to one gold rouble was decreed.'5 These last stages of
the depreciation of the Soviet rouble, leading to its total loss
of value, were a deliberate revenue-raising measure on the
part of the government.
From 1921 to 1924, while the final transition to a new and
unified currency system was in progress, the technical pro-
cedures and administrative organs of the planned economic
life of the U.S.S.R. were being developed.'8 Under the result-
ing controlled economy the statistical measures customarily
used to indicate differences between the external and internal
values of currencies, and changes in the gold holdings of the
central bank no longer had the significance properly attrib-
uted to them elsewhere. Beginning with 1924 the State Plan-
ning Commission developed for the whole Union of Soviet
Republics a series of one-year plans which were progressively
broadened in scope. The last, for 1927—28, was succeeded by
the first Five-Year Plan. The essential feature of the state
controlled internal economy of the Soviet Union was that
the greater part of domestic production and consumption
was planned. The balancing of the planned demand for goods
of the consumer, of the government, and of industrial and
Thesedetails are taken from Jack, op. cit., pp.170—5.
16 planningwork of the R.S.F.S.R.(Russia proper) involved establish-
ing in February 1921aState Planning Commission (Gosplan) to draw up an
economic plan for the country. Its primary concern was with electrification.
It was limited at first to mere cooperation with regional planning bodies and
government departments. In 1922Gosplanwas reorganized and strengthened
but even in 1923atthe Twelfth Party Congress the scope of its operations was
indefinite. In 1923theU.S.S.R. was organized. The Gosplan of the R.S.F.S.R.
became the State Planning Commission of the entire U.S. S. R. From 1923to
1928 state planning commissions were set up in the various republics, includ-
ing the R. S. F. S. R. .Afterthe scissors crisis of 1923thefunctions of Cos-
plan were extended, and in 1924thecountry embarked on the path of plan-
ning without reservation (W. A. Brown, Jr. and A. Ford llinrichs, 'The
Planned Economy of Soviet Russia,' Political Scienëe Quarterly, Sept. 1931).
The details given below of the Russian system are taken from this source.COMPLETING THE FACADE 405
agriculturalproduction units against the total planned pro-
duction for sale of industry and agriculture left over an un-
absorbed surplus of certain kinds of products and an unsat-
isfied demand for others. The sale abroad of part of this
unabsorbed surplus and the purchase abroad of part of the
means for meeting this unsatisfied demand were carried out
by a government foreign trade monopoly. The fundamental
principle of this monopoly was to balance exports against im-
ports. Temporary deficits were covered by borrowing abroad.
If loans could not be obtained, they were not incurred. Tem-
porary surpluses were covered by accumulating gold and for-
eign exchange reserves. The unsatisfied demand and unab-
sorbed production resulting from failure of the plans to work
out precisely in all details were brought together in the
private market within Russia, where the output of the small
uncontrolled sector of Russian production was also dis-
posed of.
This system of planned production and consumption was
carried out within a money economy in which the roubles
paid out as costs of production and as state expenditures were
returned in the form of prices, loans, and taxes. In order to
maintain this circulation unimpeded, the planning of physi-
cal production and consumption was accompanied by a paral-
lel system of price fixing and planning of production costs. In
a system of fixed prices production costs cannot be allowed to
fluctuate freely. In calculating them, therefore, a special
method was worked out for averaging the cost of goods pur-
chased abroad and entering into Russian production with
the cost of goods produced at home. This prevented the
planned internal price structure from being continuously dis-
turbed by world-wide price making forces. These elements
in the production costs of Russian industry which consisted
of goods partly produced abroad and partly in Russia such as
cotton, were not wholly determined by the supply and de-
mand forces that cleared the world's markets and did not
fluctuate from day to day. Finally the Russian system included406 EXPERIMENTATION
the planning of profits and losses and their allocation to dif-
ferent enterprises. Thus the productive plant of the country
was treated as a whole and the survival of productive units
was predicated upon their value to the general plan of eco-
nomic development, not upon their ability to produce profits.
If, therefore, the expenditures of the productive units of
the country as a whole were held within the limits of the
planned costs of production, and if the budget of the state as
a whole was balanced by loans and taxes, the circulation of
money would be completed, and inflation, in the sense of a
more rapid increase in the means of payment than in pro-
duction, would not take place. The inflation that actually
occurred in Russia took the form of a failure to hold produc-
tion costs within the limits fixed by the planning authorities,
so that there was a continuous increase in the amount of
roubles put into circulation by Russian industry and collec-
tive agriculture in excess off the amount returned from circu-
lation through the sale of the product at fixed prices. Since
prices to the consumer and to industry itself were fixed over a
wide area, the curious phenomenon resulted that the impact
of this excess was felt exclusively in the restricted private
market where prices rose very rapidly, and that at times peo-
ple even came into possession of roubles they could not spend.
Under this type of economy, the banking system was de-
veloped as a device for allocating the necessary credits to the
state and the productive economy in accordance with the
various plans. There was no place in Russian theory for re-
serves against these credits. Under the Russian system re-
serves could have no practical importance, nor did metallic
reserves against notes in circulation play a real economic role;
they were in effect only a concession to established .habits of
thought abroad where confidence in Russia was influenced
by the published reserves of the Russian State Bank.'7
i7 The importance attached to large central bank reserves by foreigners was
partly responsible for the development of ideas of credit reform, finally put
into effect in 1930, which had as one of their aims the transfer of as manyCOMPLETING THE FACADE 407
After 1924 the Tchervonetz consistently maintained its
external value, but, as measured by price indexes, its internal
value declined. A black bourse developed in which foreign
currencies were quoted at a premium over the Tchervonetz.
Beginning in 1925 the State Bank began to lose gold and for-
eign exchange, note circulation rapidly increased, and the
ratio of metallic reserves to notes fell.18 For the reasons given
above, however, these developments did not have the same
significance as would be attached to them in western coun-
tries. Price indexes were not a good measure of the internal
value of the rouble. Losses of gold reserves were not the fore-
runners of either devaluation or deflation. Yet Europe and
America continued to give to these signs a western and tradi-
cional interpretation, and Russia continued, as a gold pro-
ducer, to reap a harvest because of the unlimited willingness
of other countries to give goods for gold.
Argentina
The official Argentine return to gold in 1927was an event
of little technical importance in the management of the Ar-
gentine currency system. Under the Law of 1899 the Argen-
tine Caja de Conversion was obligated to convert paper pesos
offered to it into gold pesos weighing 1.6129 grams of gold
fineat the rate of 44 centavos gold to one paper peso, and
issue paper pesos against deposit of gold at the same rate.
'The Argentine currency expressed in gold pesos therefore
fluctuated at all times exactly as the gold reserves of the Caja
fluctuated and a constant ratio between the gold and the
paper peso was maintained. In a formal legal sense Argentina
was on the international gold standard when no legal prohibi-
payments as possible out of the sphere of note circulation to that of offsetting
entries on the books of the State Bank. cE. W. A. Brown, Jr. 'Credit Reform
in Soviet Russia,' American Economic Review, Supplement, March 1930,
pp. 47—53.
'8Jack, op. cit., p. 178.
19Cf. 'The Return to Gold, Summary by Countries,' Federal Reserve Bulletin,
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tion was imposed upon the import or export of gold and
when there was no suspension of the Law of 1899, that is,
when the Caja de Conversion was 'open.' Between 1900 and
1914, and from August 27, 1927 to December 27, 1929, all
these conditions were present but from August g, 1914 to
August 27, 1927, and after Decembei' 27, 1929, the Caja de
Conversion was 'closed' in the sense that it was no longer
obligated to exchange gold for notes. From a strictly legal
point of view it is therefore true to say that Argentina left
the gold standard on August 9, 1914, returned to it on August
27, 1927, and departed from it again on December 27, 1929.
Several considerations, however, prevent so simple a state-
ment from being at all satisfactory as a description of the re-
lation of the Argentine currency to gold during these years,
even in a formal sense:
i) The period during which the Caja de Conversion was
closed did not coincide with the period during which gold
exports were prohibited.
2) The requirement that all new issues of paper currency
should be backed ioo per cent by gold remained in force
throughout the period and was by no means a dead letter
even when the country was 'off' gold.
3) The circulation did not, however, at any time vary directly
with gold imports and exports.
Theobligation of the Caja to buy gold remained in force
and was of great practical importance during certain periods
when the country was 'off' the gold standard and also during
certain periods when the country was 'on' the gold standard.
Theobligation of the Caja to sell gold, the suspension of
which took the country 'off' the gold standard, was of no
practical importance when the country was 'on' the gold
standard.
The official return to gold was also an event of singularly
little economic importance. From 1925 to 1929, as throughout
the Restoration period, the relations of Argentina to the
gold standard world were not determined, or even largelyCOMPLETING THE FACADE 409
by the effects upon the Argentine economy of in-
gold movements. As was true of raw material
countries in general, these relations were shaped by her own
Fiscalpolicies, the state of her harvests, and the whole general
environment created by the effort of other countries to return
'to gold, including the effects of that effort upon the central
capital markets and upon the purchasing power of her cus-
tomers. In particular they were influenced by her depend-
ence upon two major products, meat and grain, and her re-
:tationships to two competing money markets, London and
:New York. These must be taken into account before the
bearing of the legal arrangements referred to above upon the
gold standard problem can be made clear.
We therefore note briefly the major facts of Argentine cur-
rency history after 1914 in order to free the statement that
Argentina returned to gold in 1927 and left it in 1929 from
the connotations of generalized gold standard theory, and
clothe it with realistic meaning. In making this summary
statement the excellent monograph, The Foreign Debt of the
.4rgen tine Republic by H. E. Peters, will be taken as a guide.
It was never the practice of Argentina to concentrate her
gold holdings in a single central reservoir. Before the war the
Banco de la Nacion held large amounts of gold in its own
vaults against which no currency was or could be issued, but
which was used to stabilize the issue of currency by the Ca] a.
In the event of heavy gold exports by other banks that had oW
tamed the gold from the Caja by redemption of currency, the
Bancc de Ia Nacion, at its own discretion, pursued the op-
posite course. It deposited its own gold with the Caja in ex-
change for currency which it put into circulation by dis-
count:ing commercial paper. It also carried free gold reserves
through the dull season and used them in a similar way to
expand the currency to faciiitate the financing of the harvest
in expectation of a later seasonal inflow of gold from abroad.
These practices were continued and developed during and
after the war, and during the two and a half years when Ar-410 EXPERIMENTATION
gentina was 'on the gold standard' after 1927 the most impor-
tant gold imports and exports were effected without passing
through the Caja de Conversion at all. In some respects the
Banco de la Nacion and the Caja together acted as the Bank-
ing and Issue Departments of the Bank of England do when
Great Britain is on the gold standard. The analogy, however,
is not exact in several respects. The purchase and sale of
gold by the Bank of England, for example, entails, with very
minor exceptions, the issue or contraction of notes by the
Issue Department, and the Banking Department cannot stand
aside and allow a drain of gold to take effect upon the Issue
Department without trenching on its own reserve. The Banco
de Ia Nacion, however, could act in this way. It could also, as a
matter of policy, assimilate Argentine to British practice, and
the more it did so, the less accurate were the dates of the
closing and opening of the Caja as indications of the return
to and departure of Argentina from gold.
At the outbreak of the war when the Caja was closed and
the convertibility of the note issue suspended, the Banco de
Ia Nacion was given large emergency powers, among them
supervision of the foreign exchanges. The exchange had to be
supported for only a short time, however. In spite of poor
crops, especially in 1917,theArgentine trade balance during
the war was favorable, owing to a large contraction of imports
and a moderate expansion of exports. In 1916itbecame prof-
Itable to ship gold from New York to Buenos Aires, and gold
continued to flow in during 1917.Argentina,however, on ac-
count of her budget difficulties, continued to be a borrower
abroad in 1914,1915, and1916, and because the London
market was partly closed to her, turned to New York for help.
A series of short term American loans were floated, but with
the American entry into the war the New York market was
not able or willing to refund these and they began to be re-
paid in 1917fromthe accumulating credits from trade. The
Argentine government meanwhile financed its needs by in-
creasing its home floating debt. In 1918, 1919,andthe firstCOMPLETING THE FACADE 411
part of 1920 Argentine exports increased greatly, and in order
to prevent the peso from rising too rapidly in terms of dollars,
francs, and pounds, Argentina became an international
lender, accumulating large balances in New York and lending
directly to England and France.
Gold continued to flow to Argentina—partly to its embas-
sies abroad and partly to the Caja in exchange for notes. Since
the basic law governing the issue of currency had not been
altered, no multiple expansion of note issue followed, but
dollars accumulated in New York, when deposited by the
l3anco de la Nacion with the Federal Reserve banks, were
considered as gold reserves against which banking credits
would be extended.
In addition to drawing gold to a country not on the gold
standard, the strength of the Argentine exchange in igig and
the first half of 1920 had another curious effect, that of closing
the American capital market to Argentine borrowers. Argen-
tine loans were officially discouraged as likely to lead to fur-
ther gold losses from America, and therefore Argentina was
obliged, to pay off the balance of her maturing debts in Amer-
ica, partly from funds received from Great Britain in pay-
ment of war-time advances. By the end of 1920, the slate was
swept clean of Argentine dollar loans. The government mean-
while continued to finance itself through the floating debt at
home.
In the second half of 1920 the situation began to change
rapidly. Argentine currency was brought to the Banco de la
Nacion for dollars in New York, and the New York balances
began to shrink. They were being used now to peg the Ar-
gentrne exchange, and by July 1920 had fallen from $70 to
$25 million. Further withdrawals were then suspended. The
peso declined rapidly to 66 per cent of parity. In 1921 the
situation again changed. From August 192 i the peso began
to appreciate steadily, but since it was still far below parity
the 1920 objections to further American loans no longer held.
American bankers began once more to compete for Argen-412 EXPERIMENTATION
tine loans. As long as the depreciation of the peso was less in
terms of dollars than the depreciation of sterling in terms
of dollars, the London market was not a good place for Ar-
gentina to borrow, for the announced determination of Great
Britain to return to the gold standard at the old parity with
the dollar meant under these circumstances an appreciation
of sterling in pesos also. More pesos would be required to
repay a given amount off sterling than were received when
it was borrowed.2° Borrowing in New York was not easy, how-
ever, in spite of banking competition, for terms were difficult
to agree upon and negotiations were often marked by mis-
understanding and disagreement. Yet sufficient credits were
obtained in 1921 and 1922 to tide the government over diffi-
culties arising from its continued failure to balance the
budget. In 1923 a large refunding loan was urgently desired,
but the European crisis of 1922 and 1923 had had a marked
effect on the Argentine exchange which declined sharply in
New York in the first half of 1923 and caused a crisis in
Buenos Aires. This loan was not finally placed until January
1924, and then only for a smaller amount than actually
needed. In no sense was it a successful loan.
The whole situation was altered by the return of confidence
in Europe and the general opening of the American capital
market to foreign borrowers in 1924. Coinciding with good
crops which met a steady European demand, it brought pros-
perity to Argentina. The peso began a steady rise from 74
American cents in July 1924 to 91 in January 1925. When
England returned to the gold standard the peso was close to
par, and in May the embargo on the export of gold from Ar-
gentina was lifted. The decree lifting the embargo was issued
three days after England's return to gold, but applied only to
banks and individuals; the Caja remained closed. Two banks,
20Dr.Peters also mentions other exchange difficulties connected with the trans-
fer of the proceeds. The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic (Johns
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the Banco de la Nacion and the Banco de la Provincia, held
at that time about $20 million in gold, which was most of the
gold outside the Caja.21 These private gold holdings were not
increased greatly during the next two years but in 1927 and
1928 they were rapidly built up and provided the source
from which the first large gold losses of the depression were
met. 1)epression prevailed in Argentina throughout 1925 and
1926. The exchanges were weak, but since foreign capital
continued to flow in did not depreciate much. The great and
undiscriminating foreign loan market in New York was get-
ting under weigh. In 1927 a bumper crop and continued large
capita.l imports forced the Argentine peso over par in New
York. Small imports of gold were made in June and July 1927
and in August the government felt itself obliged to reopen
the Caja de Conversion. This, as Dr. Peters says, had no im-
mediate effect, as even when 'closed' the Caja would exchange
paper for gold. The strength of the Argentine demand for
gold was further revealed by imports from South Africa and
the Bank of England which were made possible when still
further borrowing in America gave added strength to the
peso. The impact of this demand was felt in England at the
moment when a policy of diverting a large part of the world's
gold demand from London to New York was just beginning
to come into effect. The Argentine position, therefore, at this
particular juncture was of peculiar importance as a factor
in the relations of the central nucleus of gold standard coun-
tries (cf. Ch. '8, The Critical Decisions of 1927)
It was from 1924 to 1927 that the really important rela-
tions between Argentina and the New York money market
were established. "The determining causes of international
borrowing," Dr. Peters writes (p. 123), "appear in this case
at least to be more closely related to the situation of the
lending capital market than to conditions in the debtor
country. The cost of capital declined consistently from 1924
21TheEconomist, June 20,1925, p. 1248.414 EXPERIMENTATION
to late 1928, and Argentine securities were sold at increas-
ingly favorable rates throughout that time regardless of the
less satisfactory internal situation." Argentina was able to rid
herself completely of her external floating debt by 1928 by
refunding loans in New York, and thereafter the government
was not a borrower in foreign markets. The inflow of Ameri-
can capital was continued, but on a declining scale by direct
private investment for some months more.
Three-quarters of the gold imported into Argentina
through the combined effects of this great capital import and
the good crops of 1927 and 1928 was not brought to the Caja
de Conversion but was retained by the Banco de la Nacion to
prevent possible inflation through expansion of the currency.
When in 1929 the peso began to decline it was from this
source that gold was drawn for export. As soon as it became
evident late in 1929 that gold would have to be withdrawn
from the Caja the right of conversion was once more sus-
pended.
Dr. Peters has succinctly summarized the role of the Argen-
tine Caja de Conversion after the war (p. 133):"Since 1914
thisinstitution has served only to limit the rise in value of
the peso as compared with gold, instead of holding its value
up to that of gold, ordinarily regarded as the main function
of a conversion agent." The Caja performed the first of these
functions in precisely the same way in 1917—20 when Argen-
tina was 'off' gold and in 1927—28 when she was 'on' gold. So
far as the function of holding up the value of the peso as com-
pared to gold was performed at all it was performed by the
gold operations of the Banco de la Nacion.
Japan of the gold standard world
were profoundly influenced between 1920and1929bythe
long established pre-war practice of maintaining exchange
stability through the use of London balances; the extraordi-
nary transformation in the Japanese economy during the war;COMPLETING THE FACADE 415
anda continuous series of unfavorable merchandise trade
balances, especially following the earthquake of 1923.
The interaction of these three influences produced two
striking results:(a) Japan, though one of the few countries
that had remained a faithful member of the dollar group
from '919 to 1923 (Charts io and 21) did not lift her em-
bargo on gold exports imposed in 1917 until January
(b)while the effort to return to gold was leading to an ac-
cumulation of balances in the central money markets by cen-
tral banks all over the world,22 Japan was rapidly dissipating
large balances already in her possession.
In 1914Japanesebalances abroad were steadily running
down. Junnosuke Inouye estimates that immediately avail-
able balances plus the Bank of Japan's gold reserve in London
were not more than 200 million yen.23 Japan had a heavy
sterling and franc debt and faced the prospect of having to
borrow to pay the interest on old loans. The crisis of 1914in
tile London money market consequently created an extremely
difficult problem of remittance for Japan for about six
months, of the same sort that the United States had to con-
tend with. But in 1915 Japan's position began to improve
radically. Large orders for supplies of every sort from the
Allies, the contraction of European competition in the home
market, an unequaled opportunity to gain a foothold in the
markets of Asia, South Africa, South America, Australia, and
the Southern Pacific, and a greatly expanded American de-
mand for silk, all contributed to Japanese prosperity. Ex-
ports and income from shipping and insurance grew by leaps
22 CI. Ch. 20,TheGold Exchange Standard as a Cold Economy Measure.
28 Problems of the Japanese Exchange, 1914—1926 (London, Macmillan, 1931),
p.2.Oursummary statements in the text are largely based on this authori-
tative source. The Bank of Japan's gold reserve in London came into existence
as part of the indemnity received by Japan after the Sino-Japanese war. It
was kept in London because England at that time was unwilling to see the
whole amount shipped to Japan in gold for fear of adverse effects in the
London money market. It was added to in 1902andafter the Russo-Japanese
war from the proceeds of loans placed abroad, and fluctuated between ioo
and zoo million yen.416 EXPERIMENTATION
and bounds and transformed the balance of payments,24 the
main features of which from 1914 to 1924 are here given.
INVISIBLE
MDSE. INCOME& BULLION
TRADE EXPENDITURE & SPECIE
Imports —(millionsof yen)
1914 —4 —6 20
1915 '75 69 20
1916 277 —72
1917 567 415 —238
igi8 293 578 —4
1919 —74 504 —322
1920 —387 420 —400
1921 —361 '95 —138
1922 —252 154 I
1923 —534 I69 5
1924 162
TheJapanese exchange banks were wholly unprepared for
the flood of foreign exchange that the new export surpluses
brought them. They could not get gold in London at all
during the war. Before the American gold export embargo
was imposed they imported gold from New York and gold
held in Japan increased 235 million yen, but in September
1917 this means of remittance home was shut off. Therefore
other means of dealing with the new foreign assets had to be
found. There were no institutions in Japan organized to sell
foreign securities and practically no market for them. In spite
of great efforts Japanese foreign investments could only be
increased 1,400 million yen from 1915 to 1919.25 Half of this
increase was in the form of Japanese government war loans to
Great Britain, France, and Russia, and a substantial part of
the rest is accounted for by the political Nishihara loans to
China. The government converted only go million yen of
sterling and franc debt into internal debt and reduced its
total external debt only 182 million yen. Consequently Japa-
nese bank balances abroad grew with surprising rapidity.
Most of them came first to the Yokohama Specie Bank and the
Bank of Taiwan which financed the bulk of Japan's export
24 Ibid., pp. 222—3,234—5.
25H. G. Moultdn and Junichi Ko, Japan, an EconomicandFinancial
praisal (Brookings Institution, 1931),pp.282, 289.COMPLETING THE FACADE 417
trade.These exchange banks were put in a difficult position.
They could not get yen to pay the exporters by importing
gold, and had to borrow from the Bank of Japan at rates
higher than they could earn on their balances abroad. At the
same time they had to watch the value in yen of their sterling
and even of their dollar balances decline. By May 1918 these
balances reached approximately 500 million yen and were
prevented from being much larger only by sales of foreign
exchange to the Japanese government which took advantage
of th:is unique opportunity to prepare for the maturity, still
six years distant, of the 41,4percent sterling loans of 1905.
TheBank of Japan also purchased some foreign exchange
from the exchange banks and added to its holdings by ad-
vancing working capital to Japanese traders exporting to
India, South Africa, South America, and the Southern Pacific.
These advances were repaid in foreign exchange, ivhich
brought the equivalent of about 130 million yen in sterling
and (lollars to the Bank of Japan. From these two sources the
Bank. acquired a new foreign asset, distinct from its 'reserve
deposit abroad,' known as 'foreign currency balances.' When
the American gold embargo was lifted in June 1919,thediffi-
culties of the exchange banks were extreme, and in spite of
an informal gentleman's agreement not to take more gold
than was absolutely necessary from America, they felt obliged
to import gold and reduce their loans at the Bank of Japan.
From June to December 1919goldheld in Japan increased
252millionyen.
In this way Japan, from being an international debtor to
the extent of 1,223millionyen in 1914,becamean interna-
tional creditor to the extent of 1,398 million yen in 1919,26
andi:he balances of the Bank of Japan and of the government
(inconveniently lumped in Japanese statistics under the head-
ing 'gold funds abroad') rose from 213 to millionyen.
The Armistice, however, had radically altered the whole
underlying position. Exports did not decline in 1919,but
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imports began to grew rapidly in the summer, and for the
whole year there was a slight merchandise import surplus.
This increased rapidly in the first quarter of 1920. The ex-
change banks, with their foreign balances depleted, were
now having difficulty in financing imports rather than ex-
ports. They consequently asked the Bank of Japan and the
government to resell to them part of their previously accumu-
lated foreign balances. The equivalent of almost ioo million
yen was obtained in this way with a corresponding reduction
in the Japanese circulation. Mr. Inouye, at that time Gover-
nor of the Bank of Japan, states categorically that the fear
and uncertainty inspired by this operation was the immediate
cause of the ending of Japanese prosperity in March 1920,
and this in its turn was the forerunner of the end of the
world-wide restocking boom.
With the end of the artificial prosperity of Japan's over-
expanded industries, Japanese exports declined, and the ex-
change banks found that they did not need the balances they
had just acquired. They resumed the import of gold. At the
same time the Bank of Japan began to liquidate its 'foreign
currency balances' and bring them home in gold. Conse-
quently in 1920 'gold held abroad' declined 219 million yen
and gold in Japan increased 419millionyen. The gold re-
serve of the Bank of Japan, immobilized by the continuation
of the gold export embargo of 1917,reachedabout i,ioo
million yen. This did not quite end Japanese gold imports.
The bulk of America's gold exports after the lifting of the
embargo had gone to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and India, and
in 1921 gold began to flow back from these markets to the
United States. This movement was checked by Japanese pur-
chases against dollar balances in New York, and the govern-
ment used the gold thus acquired as a reserve against notes
of small denomination and to meet domestic requirements
in the arts. In May 1921 gold in Japan touched 1,200 million
yen, and remained at about that figure until after the earth-
quake. Foreign balances, on the contrary, continued to beCOMPLETING THE FACADE 419
drawn down, and for three years were the chief means of
supporting the yen. This was in accordance with long estab-
lished practice, for ever since the receipt of the Chinese in-
demnity in 1897 the Japanese had been accustomed to sup-
porting the exchanges by drawing on balances in London.
From 1920 to 1922 the yen tended downward, but it was
prevented from falling below 47½cents.The exchange was
supported by the repayment of Japanese war advances to
Great Britain and France of 196 million yen, but foreign bal-
ances had to be drawn on to the extent of 706 million yen.
This supported the exchange but did not reduce the cost of
living in Japan. Japanese prices declined much less than
prices in Great Britain and the United States, and the yen
was becoming over-valued. The exchange banks encouraged
their customers to continue their imports, indicating to them
that the financing could be easily accomplished with the aid
of government foreign balances. Large scale internal credits
were made available by the banks. As a consequence, liquida-
tion was very incomplete and many unsound positions were
carried forward to add later to the severity of the banking
crisis of 1927.27
Recovery from the 1920—21 crisis was stimulated in part by
the development of the chemical and public utility industries,
and in part by the growth of exports which in the spring of
1922 seemed to be benefiting from the weakness of the yen.
Though foreign balances were low and falling gradually, the
economic position was improving in 1923 until the whole
course of events was changed by the earthquake of Septem-
ber i. This disaster was followed after a few months by a re-
construction boom which continued throughout 1924 and
1925 and rivaled that of the war years in intensity. Both pub-
lic and private finance, however, were in serious difficulties.
Many bills and loans became uncollectible and very large
new advances were made to finance reconstruction. Heavy
27Ibid.,,pp. 305, go8. The summary of events after 1926 in the text is based
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imports, timber in particular, were suddenly required, and
in the first quarter of 1924 the yen for the first time became
seriously depreciated in dollars. At the time of the earth-
quake the government's foreign balances were down to 550
million yen, but of this amount 350 million yen were ear-
marked for the repayment of the 41,4 per cent sterling loan
falling due in 1925. The exchange banks tried to support the
yen, but succeeded only in opening a wide spread between
the dollar rate as quoted in Tokyo and in New York, and
were forced to follow the New York quotation downward.
By December 1923 the foreign balances were reduced to 444
million yen, and in January and February 1924 no returns
were published. This gives rise to a presumption that the
balances so carefully husbanded to meet the approaching ster-
ling maturity had been trenched on. In any event they were
rendered unnecessary by the appearance of Japan for the
first time as a large scale borrower in New York in February.
A $150 million 61,4 per cent loan was placed, of which about
two-thirds was used to repay sterling loans and one-third for
earthquake reconstruction; 28aseries of other loans extending
into 1925 followed. In March Japanese foreign balances were
again published, but were only 292 million yen. The Ameri-
can loans caused merely a brief recovery in the yen, and the
downward movement was soon resumed. At the end of the
year the rate was being held at 381/2 cents. No returns of
foreign balances were made from April to December 1924
and they were apparently exhausted.
During 1925 the yen continued to be weak, but was made
a vehicle for Chinese speculation as a hedge against seasonal
changes in the price of silver. Consequently it rose in Febru-
ary, but fell again in July. More constructive influences, how-
ever, soon began to appear. The weakness of the yen stimu-
lated Japanese exports, and the government began to make
small gold exports from its own stock in Japan. These were
28Cf.Feters, cit., p. iig,forthe adverse effect of this operation upon
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not important in themselves, but the construction put upon
them 'wasthatthe embargo might be lifted, and they might
soon be followed by large exports from the immobilized re-
serve of i,ioo million yen of the Bank of Japan. Based on this
expectation, sustained speculation for the rise began in New
York late in i 925. The yen began a long upward movement
which continued throughout 1926. Early in 1927 the yen was
just below par and the government made preparations for
lifting the embargo.
Mr. Inouye has pointed out the striking analogy between
the position of Japan at this time and that of England in
]:924. The yen, like the pound, was over-valued and both
countries were bound to increase the difficulties of a basic
export commodity, coal in the case of England and silk in the
c:ase of Japan, by returning to par unless a painful internal
price readjustment were carried out. Both the yen and the
pound had been carried close to par by speculative purchases,
and had to meet the danger of a withdrawal of foreign specu-
lators' balances after stabilization. On the other hand the suc-
cess of France in stabilizing on a low level had not been lost
upon the Japanese. Furthermore, 1924 and 1925, when the
yen was falling, had been years of feverish prosperity in Ja-
pan, and 1926, when the yen was rising, had been a year of
depression, and this association was firmly fixed in the public
mind. :For these reasons the return to gold at par had become
a burning political issue in Japan.29
The government, however, was determined to act, and as a
preliminary step tried to liquidate some of the 'earthquake'
bills held by the banks. General discussion of measures de-
signed to indemnify and otherwise protect the banks from
losses arising from this liquidation undermined public con-
fidence. Runs by depositors began and loans were called in
to assure liquidity. A severe banking panic ensued during
which 36 institutions were closed. It was stopped by legisla-
tion permitting the Bank of Japan to grant emergency ad-
29 Cf. Inc'uye, op. cit., pp. igi if., and Moulton, op. cit., p. 404.422 EXPERIMENTATION
vances to banks subjected to withdrawals and giving large
scale assistance to financial institutions in Taiwan which were
hard hit by the calling in of loans. The lifting of the em-
bargo was again postponed, but the banking crisis of 1927
was followed by readjustment, liquidation, and rationaliza-
tion of industry. It was a period of great industrial advance.
Though Japan had again become a debtor country, the large
adverse trade balances of 1923 to 1926 were not repeated, and
in 1929.forthe first time in a decade, an approximate bal-
ance was struck in Japan's merchandise trade, and a new gov-
ernment came into office pledged to carry through a rigid
policy of deflation leading to a de jure return to gold.
Japan, therefore, was finally ready to return to gold when
the gold standard system was beginning to disintegrate at the
periphery, when her large war-time accumulations of foreign
exchange had been spent, and when she had once more be-
come a debtor country. The success of this return was un-
usually dependent upon the expansion of exports, but these
were already menaced by the clouds of an approaching world
depression.
Certain Aspects of the Belgian and Italian Stabilizations
The relations of the three countries just considered, Russia,
Argentina, and Japan, to the international gold standard
system present a picture of great diversity which is in sharp
contrast to the generalization of the principles of currency
stabilization contained in the currency resolution of the
Genoa Conference and embodied in the stabilization pro-
grams of many states. Even within the group of countries in
which these general principles were honored there were great
differences in their practical application, some of which are
well illustrated by the Belgian and Italian stabilizations. In
particular the struggles of the Belgian and Italian authorities
to free their respective currencies from their dependence
upon the French franc in order to stabilize 'in gold' exempli-
fies some of the effects of the breakup of the sterling-dollar-COMPLETING THE FACADE 423
franc nucleus, and the different attitudes of the two countries
in their choice of a stabilization level brings out two strik-
ingly different facets of the competitive element in the re-
turn to gold.
BELGIUM
From 1919 to 1925 Belgian exchange on New York followed
the French exchange in both its trends and major fluctua-
tions (Charts 22 and 24). But the minor fluctuations of the
two currencies were not the same. Until the end of 1920 the
Belgian exchange appreciated in Paris, but from December
1921 to August 1923 the French franc rose in Brussels to
124.24 and remained strong until March 1924, when it was
121.22. This relationship was in general maintained during
the rest of 1924 in spite of substantial fluctuations in both
currencies in terms of pounds and dollars, though the tend-
ency of the French franc was to fall in Brussels.8° In 1925 there
was inflation in France and the French franc depreciated
continuously in London and New York. Early in the year the
39 L. H,. Dupriez, 'Les Etapes de 1'Adaptation Economicjue a une Inflation
Soudain.e: France et Bclgique, de 1919 a 1926,' Economic Essays in Honor of
Gustav Cassel (London, Allen and Unwin, 1933), pp. 126—7.Thethesis of
Nt Dupriez is that the French and Belgian exchanges moved together only
so long as the internal monetary developments of the two countries were
;imilar, and that their mutual fluctuations were governed by their internal
monetary policies. He describes the rise of the French franc in Brussels from
1921 to 1924 as follows: "On the one hand, in France, the circulation was
slightly contracted in 1921 and kept stable in the next two years, on the
other hand in Belgium notes in circulation continued to rise slowly: in 1921
:ind 1922toreplace current accounts, and in 1923 thanks to an increase in
commercial discounts related to a business revival."
His charts show the beginnings of a divergence between French and Belgian
prices, deposits, and note circulation in 1924,whichbecame very marked
during 1925, when there was inflation in France but not in Belgium. M.
:Dupriez treats the whole period from March 1924, when the French franc
ntood at 121.22 in Brussels, to February 1926, when it had fallen to So.88, as
one phase (the third since 1920)in Franco-Belgian currency history: "The
I:hird phase is that of the stability of the Belgian franc, while the French
franc depreciated, the divergence being especially noticeable after the spring
of :925. The cause is not far to seek: on the one side there is absolute sta-424 EXPERIMENTATION
Belgian government began to take measures looking toward
a stabilization of the London-Brussels exchange and intended
to counteract the forces that bound the French and Belgian
francs together.3' Inflation was not permitted in Belgium,
and in the spring of 1925 the Belgian franc remained stable
in New York, and therefore continued to appreciate in Paris.
The declining French exchange however did exert sufficient
pressure on the Belgian franc to destroy its stability in New
York and London, and in the summer of 1925 both currencies
fell rapidly and together in these markets. The French franc
was temporarily pegged after this decline, but the Belgian
franc continued to depreciate and in September 1925 the re-
lation of the two currencies was again what it had been at the
beginning of the year.
The situation was then altered by a definite stabilization
plan in Belgium, which contemplated balancing the state
budget, the repayment of a large part of the state debt to the
National Bank of Belgium, a foreign loan of from $100mil-
lion to $150 million to build up the reserves of the Bank, the
formal devaluation of the currency, and the resumption of
convertibility into gold or gold exchange. This plan began
to go into practical operation in June 1925. The government
transferred to the Bank as an exchange fund part of a $ioo
million loan placed in New York in December 1924 and June
1925, and in the autumn the Bank received a special exchange
credit of $27.5 million. By October the Bank was able to
stabilize the exchange de facto at 107 francs to the pound.
The Belgian franc ceased to share in the further depreciation
of the French franc and once more rose rapidly in Paris. In
November the government demanded million francs in
bility of the fiduciary circulation, on the other side, inflation is foreshadowed
and is realized." The considerations stated in the text suggest that this posi-
tion greatly underestimates the power of attraction of the French franc over
the Belgian franc.
Leagueof Nations, Memorandum on Currency and Central Banks, 1913—
1925, I, achart shows clearly the relative movements of the two currencies
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new taxation to balance the budget and the necessary fiscal
Eaws were passed by the end of 1925. The National Bank "ap-
plied a severe discount policy, and those who required foreign
exchange had to obtain the necessary payment by drawing
against their bank deposits. This led the commercial banks
to dispose of treasury bonds by presenting them for pay-
ment." 32 The utility to private banks of short term treasury
obligations as a means of resisting deflationary policies of
central banks was thus illustrated in Belgium, as in England
in and in Italy and France at various times. Early in
1926 Laws necessary to give effect to the currency plan were
passed. Provisional foreign credits had been established and
only the final negotiation of the foreign loans was needed to
complete stabilization.
During the entire de facto stabilization, however, the Bel-
gian exchange had been under pressure. The continued de-
cline of the French franc had created difficult competition for
Belgian exporters and had encouraged a flight of capital from
Belgium, partly because of the traditional relation of the two
currencies.33 The foreign credits available to support the ex-
change were heavily drawn upon.34 Within Belgium the high
level of stabilization was effectively attacked politically, and
difficulties encountered in the final stages of the negotiations
of new foreign loans caused them to fail. On March 15,1926
the National Bank ceased to intervene in the exchange mar-
ket and the whole stabilization proposal had to be postponed.
A rapid decline in the Belgian franc followed, accompanied
by a sharp increase in both the wholesale price and cost of
living indexes. The government was forced to obtain new
credits from the Bank to meet an ever increasing demand for
82 Jack, op. cit., p. 139. Mr. Jack adds that "les grosses coupures" or bonds of
100,000 francs and upward, mainly held by banks, declined from i,Boo million
in September 1925 to 520 million in May 1926.
Dupriez stresses the influence of the fall of the French franc upon capital
exports from Belgium in the winter of 1925—26; cit., p. 128.
°4Jack,op. cit., p. igg, states that de facto stabilization cost Belgium $107
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the repayment of treasury bills. At the end of May a new
cabinet was formed with M. Franqui as Finance Minister. He
immediately began to prepare for a new stabilization at a
much lower level. Drastic steps were taken to eliminate the
large floating debt and restore confidence in government
finances. On June 7,1926 a new institution, the Fonds
d'Amortissement de la Dette Publique, was established to
which special revenues were assigned, an example later fol-
lowed in France. New taxes calculated to yield 1,500 million
francs were at the same time imposed. In July an extremely
acute financial crisis occurred in France, which led to the as-
sumption of power by Poincaré, and in the same month the
Belgian government was granted exceptional financial powers
for six months. It proceeded vigorously to solve the problem
of the floating debt and forced the conversion of treasury bills
and five month treasury bonds into the preferred stock of the
National Railways, whose 'industrialization' had been one of
the stumbling blocks to the earlier stabilization negotiations.
July 1926 was thepoint in the depreciation of both the
French and Belgian francs. The average rate of the Belgian
franc in New York was 2.4250 cents and of the French franc,
2.4658 cents. The forces that had so long bound the two cur-
rencies together had once more asserted themselves. This did
not, however, mean the renewal of a new constant relation-
ship between them. During the rest of 1926 the French franc
was rising, but the Belgian franc was held near its low level.
Belgian exports were stimulated by the low exchange and by
the British coal strike. Confidence in the government was in-
creased by the consolidation of the floating debt. In October
it was possible to renew negotiations for a stabilization loan.
A $ioo million loan was raised and on October 24, 1926 the
National Bank pegged the exchange atifrancs to the
pound. A new currency unit, the Belga, was introduced,
largely to distinguish the Belgian from the French franc and
to emphasize its independence. Repatriation of capital helpedCOMPLETING THE FACADE 427
ito strengthen the market and the new stabilization was suc-
The rise of the French franc to 3.91 cents, before it
was stabilized de facto, completely reversed the position of
the two currencies as compared to March 1926, at the close
of the first period of de facto Belgian stabilization. Belgium
entered the ranks of countries on a de jure gold exchange
standard with a currency whose undervaluation in terms of
the dollar was almost double that of the French franc.85 There
is no doubt that the wish to obtain this 'prime de change'
was an essential part of the plan worked out by M. Franqui.
In this respect the Belgian stabilization was radically different
from that of Italy.
ITALY
When the European-American exchange rate of 1920—2 2 was
broken up, the Italian lira followed neither sterling nor the
French franc. It displayed no general trend in terms of the
dollar, and was in fact a member of the dollar group. Its
fluctuations, however, were larger than those of other mem-
bers of that group, and from April 1922 to October 1923, and
again during the last three quarters of 1924 they were similar
to those of the French franc (Chart 24). Toward the end
of 192ij, the lira began to decline slightly in New York, and
d.uring the first seven months of 1925 it depreciated rapidly.
The balance of trade during the winter of 1924—25 was un-
usually adverse to Italy, and speculation in the Italian securi-
and exchange markets was active. In June 1925 an ex-
change crisis developed which was checked in August only by
vigorous governmental action.8° The decline in the exchange
was faithfully reflected in the course of Italian prices. In this
depreciation the lira followed the downward course of the
35Jack states that on the basis of wholesale prices this undervaluation was 22
per cent; op. cit., p. 141; ci. Dupriez, op. cit., p. 121, charts.
86 C. E. McGuire, italy's International Economic Position (Macmillan, 1926),
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franc in both its trend and fluctuations until July,87 when the
decline of the franc was halted by pegging operations. These
were, however, only temporarily successful and in September
the franc began to decline again. This time the lira, like the
Belgian franc, did not follow, but after a sharp recovery en-
tered into a period of de facto stabilization. The Italian gov-
ernment, like the Belgian, wished to break the connection
binding its currency to Paris. Restrictions were placed upon
the freedom of the exchange markets, and the National Ex-
change Institute was revived with nearly allits war-time
powers. Mr. McGuire summarizes the new exchange restric-
tions (p. as follows:
"New open credits in lire for foreigners were forbidden, as well
as the discount of exchange drawn by foreign firms on their lira
deposits in Italy. The purchase of foreign bills was forbidden
except when the price in lire should be immediately paid in full.
Detailed reports from the banks to the Ministry of Finance were
exacted, particularly with a view to determine whether proceeds
of credits abroad would henceforth be disposed of at prices ex-
ceeding their cost."
OnNovember14, 1925 the Italian war debt to the United
States was settled. A $100 million Italian government loan
was immediately placed in New York by a Morgan syndicate.
On January 27, 1926 the Anglo-Italian war debt was settled.
Both war-debt agreements were exceptionally favorable to
Italy and led to an inflow of foreign capital, which was further
encouragedby the balancing of the budget for the financial
year 1924—25andthe reduction of the internal debt. Condi-
tions were favorable to de facto stabilization and the exchange
was kept steady at about 4 cents to the lira from September
1925throughApril 1926.
In May an elaborate plan for the consolidation of the note
issue and the concentration of the gold and foreign exchange
37Theseclose relationships between Italian prices and exchange, and between
the Italian and French exchanges are dearly shown in a chart in the League
of Nations Memorandum on Currency and Central Banks, 1913—1925,I,COMPLETING THE FACADE 429
reserves of the note issuing banks in the hands of the Bank
of Italy was carried through, but the lira was unsettled by
new crises abroad. The British coal strike, which, instead of
stimulating exports, as in the case of Belgium, had added to
the cost of Italian imports, now reached its culmination in the
2eneral strike. This spread uneasiness in Europe and led to
withd:rawals of capital throughout the continent. The internal
crisis in France was growing more intense and the franc was
steadily falling. The lira, which had again begun to depreciate,
continued to decline until August.
This situation was met by a vigorous policy of deflation. On
September ithegovernment announced a plan of currency
reform. It turned over to the Bank of Italy the proceeds of
the Morgan loan of November 1925 as an aid in supporting
the exchange. This reduced the outstanding debt of the gov-
ernment to the Bank 2½ milliard lire as a first step toward
its liquidation,38 and added to the reserves of the central bank
(TabI.eB and C)Thisand other less important measures
of reform dealing with the composition of the currency were
easily carried through but, in applying strict deflationary pres-
sure on the banks, resistance was encountered. An unusual
demand for the repayment of treasury bills, of which 15½
milliard were outstanding in October 1926, immediately
arose. Italy shared the experiences of England, France, and
Belgium in this respect. In its Annual Report for 1926 the
Bank of Italy spoke of the treasury bills as containing "ele-
ments of inflation obviously detrimental to price levels." This
statement can be generalized into a principle of great impor-
tance for the whole problem of credit control. Whenever a
large volume of short term government obligations is out-
standing in the hands of banks, a great potential power of
38The government debt to the Bank of Issue had been gradually diminished
since the advent of the Fascist regime; McGuire,cit., p. i8g, table.
Thespecie reserves of the note issuing banks had been at a low level during
the entire post-war period, about 61/2 per cent of the note issues, largely be-
cause of the transfer of gold to the Bank of England during the war; ibid.,
p.i88; cf. Ch. 2,GoldConcentration.430 EXPERIMENTATION
resistance against any deflationary central banking policy is
present. To eliminate such resistance the Italian government
carried out a large scale consolidation of the floating debt in
November 1926 which was partly voluntary, but also partly
compulsory. During 1926 the freedom of the foreign exchange
market was further restricted by limiting the right to deal in
foreign exchange to Italian banks having a capital of over
ioo million lire, and on November 14 control was extended
to private borrowing abroad by a decree the relevant parts of
which read:
"The Finance Minister is authorized to purchase, up to a total
amount of $zoo,ooo,ooo, the proceeds of foreign loans concluded
abroad by enterprises of Italian nationality, whose production is
likely(i)to affect considerably the employment of labor and
the economic activity of the country;(2) either to increase ex-
ports, or utilize national resources with the effect of reducing
imports. Each particular transaction will be submitted by the
Finance Minister to the approval of the Cabinet Council.
For the above transactions the Finance Minister is authorized to
order that the Royal treasury give a guaranty to the borrowing
concerns that the same exchange rate at which the foreign cur-
rencies have been taken over will apply to the currencies which
will be necessary for the service of the loans. The borrowing
concerns, however, must supply the Italian currency which is
required to meet the service of the loans, at the agreed rate of
exchange." 40
InFebruary '927 the National Institute of Foreign Exchange
was reorganized, practically as a department of the Bank of
Italy, and its powers broadened. Throughout 1927 it carried
out the government policy of exchange appreciation by con-
tinually intervening in the market. It acquired the resources
to do so by borrowing at the Bank of Italy and repaid its loans
by transferring the foreign exchange it had bought to the
Bank. By this means the gold and foreign exchange reserves
of the Bank of Italy were regularly built up (Table 59 C)
40Federal Reserve Bulletin, Aug. 1927,p.595.COMPLETING THE FACADE 431
From August 1926 to June 1927 the Italian lira rose from
an average rate in New York of 3.295 cents to 5.58 19 cents, a
level slightly higher than the rate finally chosen for de jure
stabilization. Without having suffered an equal previous de-
preciation, it was forced upward for four months after the
rise of the franc had been checked. In 1927 it was a definitely
overvalued currency. This policy of exchange appreciation
wasaccompaniedby persistent deflationary pressure on the
Italian economy. In its annual reports the Bank of Italy has
stated i:hat in 1926 "almost every branch of Italian industry
experienced a slowing down of activity," and in 1927 "almost
every industry felt the consequences of the currency revalua-
tion, which was not immediately followed by corresponding
changes in price levels, and still less by changes in wage
levels." In neither year, of course, could the rise of the lira
be held accountable for all aspects of the unfavorable eco-
nomic position of Italian industry and agriculture, but it was
one cause among others, and as such it was more strongly
stressed by the Bank of Italy in 1927 than in 1926.
Count Volpi, the architect of the Italian return to gold, has
summarized the successive stages of the Italian stabilization:
"a. Balancing of the national budget. 2. Consolidation of war
debts. 3. Unification of the note issue and its concentration in the
hands of the Bank of Italy. 4. Progressive and more efficient utili-
zation of Italian resources in raw materials. 5. Gradual deflation
in currency and in credit. 6. Consolidation of the floating debt,
and reorganization in the Treasury department. 7. Regulation of
th.e influx of foreign capital into Italian industry. 8. Reorganiza-
lion in the whole field of production, and readjustment of taxes
with a view to increased industrial efficiency. g. Gradual amortiza-
tion of the domestic debt. io. Defense of the Treasury surplus by
the reduction of State expenditures." 41
Oneof the dominant motives in the formulation and execu-
tion of this program was national prestige. In surveying the
results of the whole effort the Bank of Italy wrote in its An-
4'Stabilizingthe Lira,' Foreign Affairs, April 1928, pp. 467 if.432 EXPERIMENTATION
nual Report for 1927: "When we think of the level of depre-
ciation which had been reached and the improved level which
has been recovered by force of will and patience, we cannot
help having every confidence in the future, provided that the
determination of not deviating from the main road which
has been followed in the last years remain firm and is adhered
to, as it doubtless will be."
On December 31,1927 Italyadopted de jure a gold ex-
change standard system at a new parity of 7.919113gramsof
fine gold per ioo lire, or 19lireper dollar. For the first time
since i894,the currency was made convertible into gold or
into foreign currencies convertible into gold at prices not ex-
ceeding gold export point. The profit resulting from the re-
valuation of the gold assets of the Bank of Italy was used to
cancel the state debt to the Bank, and the gold held abroad at
the Bank of England was eliminated from the reserve and
carried as a liability of the state to the Bank. A twelve month
stabilization credit for $125 million with one renewal was
negotiated, of which $75 million was an inter-central bank
credit with i6 central banks participating, and million
was a credit extended by British and American private bank-
ing firms. In these respects the Italian return to gold illustrated
the Genoa principles of gold economy, the attraction of
foreign capital, and inter-central bank cooperation. It illus-
trated also the basic principles of balancing the state budget
and freeing the central bank from demands for credit from
the state. But it was accomplished by a revival of many war-
time mechanisms of exchange control and large restrictions
on the free movement of private capital.CHAPTER 15
The Place of the French Stabilization in Gold
Standard History
Our account of the substantial completion of the gold stand-
ard facade outside the central nucleus is a summary of events
at the periphery. It does not, in its skeleton form, and could
not even if greatly elaborated, interpret the significance of the
legal rrieasures which by 1928boundthe outside world in a
stable exchange relationship to the great powers at the heart
of the gold standard system. The true meaning of this series
of de j ure stabilizations must be read in the light of the funda-
mentally unbalanced world economy in which they took place
and of the interrelationship existing between the central
money markets. These brief summaries have, however,
touched at many points on the major stabilization operation
of 1925—28,theFrench stabilization, and an examination of
the French stabilization leads straight to the heart of the post-
war gold standard labyrinth. It provides the key to many of
the most important relationships existing between Great
Britain, the United States, France, and Germany. Further,
just as the German stabilization of 1924 left a technical herit-
age that modified the whole subsequent history of the gold
standard, so the French stabilization left a technical heritage
that gave France a peculiar and at times a dominant position
in the gold standard world. In order to provide the back-
ground for the extraordinary transformation in the interna-
tional position of the franc that produced this result, a brief
recapitulation of French currency history from 1919 to 1924
is necessary. It was the other side of the shield which in the
case of Germany was designated 'Political Economics, 1919—
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1924.' The same caption may therefore be applied to France
also.
Political Economics, '919—1924, Recapitulation
When the franc was unpegged in March 1919 no serious
doubts were entertained in France as to the resumption by
the franc of its 'normal' position in the world's currency
system. Taking into account changes in the value of gold,'
the French note issue was not excessive. A temporary decline
in the franc to give time for a correction of the obvious over-
valuation of war-time pegging did not seem disastrous. In-
flationary finance in 1919, however, brought about a collapse.
The franc fell in New York far more rapidly than the pound
(Chart io), and by April 1920 was only 32.36 per cent of
its pre-war dollar parity. Thereafter the imposition of new
taxes and the flotation of loans prevented further inflationary
finance. The French government, moreover, formally com-
mitted itself to a deflationary policy by embodying in legisla-
tion the terms of a convention reached with the Bank of
France. By the Law of December 31,1920it undertook to
repay to the Bank of France advances of two milliard francs
per annum. Though this repayment was made in full in 1921
only at the expense of an increase in other floating debt,2 and
was only partly made in 1922, still the Law of December 31,
1920 established a policy and increased confidence. As a con-
sequence the franc was able to move in general harmony with
sterling, and from April 1920 to April 1922 the franc-dollar
rate, as part of the general European-American exchange rate,
rose from 6.27 to 8.99 cents (Chart 22).
The franc, however, was subject to certain influences not
shared by sterling. The French budget, which specialists unite
hi identifying as the primary source of French currency diffi-
culties, was burdened by reconstruction expenses which from
1Cf.Ch. 8, An Abstract Conception of Gold as an International Monetary
Standard, and Ch. io, America drags her Golden Anchor.
2E.L. Duties, The French Franc, 1914—1928(Macmillan,1929),pp.137—8.
Liberal use has been made of this source in the summary account of French
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1920 to 1923 ranged from 11½ to 17½ milliard francs. These
were met from a special budget covering expenses recover-
able under the Versailles Treaty, pensions, and interest on
dtebt incurred to meet expenditures under these heads. R. G.
Hawtrey points out that this special budget was responsible,
in a sense, for the collapse of the franc, for it was, in his strik-
ing phrase, "a consecrated deficit."It tied up the prospects
of the French franc with those of the German mark. Any
doubts concerning Germany's capacity to pay were immedi-
ately reflected in diminished confidence in the franc. Because
of this deficit also, the Bank of France was burdened with ad-
vances to the state and was not technically in a position to
counteract flights from the franc.
The franc, therefore, was peculiarly sensitive to the acute
reparation crisis of 1922 which was brought to a head by the
accession of Poincaré to power in July and the end of Briand's
conciliatory policy toward Germany. In May it began to fall
in New York and parted company with the sterling nucleus
(Chart 24). In November foreign speculation for the decline
became very active and the confidence of the French in their
own currency began to be seriously undermined. The average
daily rate on New York declined to 5.25 cents in December
from 8.99 cents in April. The government deficit for 1923
W2LS i8 milliard, of which only 1 11,4milliardwas due to re-
construction expenses, and the government was again unable
to comply with the terms of the Law of December 31, 1920.
In January 1924 a loan offered by the Credit National was a
failure. 'This was ominous because the floating debt was kept
'French Monetary Policy' in The Art of Central Banking (Longmans Green,
1932),p.Mr.Hawtrey's penetrating analysis of French finance has also
been freely drawn upon in this chapter.
4TheCredit National was formed in October igig to facilitate the reparation
of war damages in France. Its capital of ioo million francs was subscribed by
credit institutions and industrial enterprises. It did not receive deposits but
secured funds by offering its own debentures to the public, investing the
proceeds in advances to victims of war damage against their daim for indem-
nity and in three to ten year loans to industry and commerce. With the corn-
plei:ion of its war functions it became a bank for making industrial advances.
Cf. Willis and Beckhart, Foreign Banking Systems (Holt, 1929), p. 6'S.436 EXPERIMENTATION
down only by the flotation of bonds, and the government was
completely dependent upon the willingness of the public to
take bonds if it was to escape outright inflationary finance.
The franc continued to fall in New York, reaching 3.49 cents
on March 8, 1924.
On the eve of the Experts Report on reparation and at the
moment when Dr. Schacht was negotiating in London for
credits for his Gold Discount Bank, France was faced with a
serious financial crisis. Increases in the Bank of France dis-
count rates in January 1924 had proved ineffective, and the
crisis was actually met, first by the imposition of new taxes,
the 'double décime' of M. Poincaré enacted on March i3,
and second by foreign borrowing. Largely because of the de-
cision to impose new taxes it was possible for the government
to secure credits of $ioo million and £4 million through J. P.
Morgan and Company and Lazard Brothers and Company
against pledge of part of the gold reserve of the Bank of
France. These credits were at once utilized to support the
franc which rose from cents on March 8 to 6.71 cents on
April 22.
The extreme rapidity of this improvement brought out an
institutional factor of great importance which had a direct
bearing upon the technical methods later developed for
handling the greater crisis of the summer of 1926. The Bank
of France, in 1924,hadno power to buy gold at a premium or
to buy securities in the open market. It was not technically
equipped, therefore, to combat a violent rise in the franc ex-
change,5 and by so doing to prevent loss of confidence follow-
ing a subsequent technical reaction in the rate. Such a tech-
nical reaction did occur, and the franc fell steadily from April
22 to the end of May. On June i,1924it was just under 5
cents in New York. The Treasury had been able, however, to
replenish the Morgan credit largely by selling 7 per cent
bonds in New York, and the Bank of France had bought dol-
tars and pounds in the strong markets of March and April.8
Hawtrey, op. cit., p. 6. 6Dulles,op. cit., p. '76.COMPLETING THE FACADE 437
After the crisis of 1924 France was in the position of having
reasonable assurance that the ordinary budget would be bal-
anced by the new taxes and that cash expenditures for re-
construction would be met by payments under the Dawes
Plan, the acceptance of which by France was greatly facilitated
by the return of the Left to power. Yet certain dangers to the
currency remained; first, the psychological danger created by
the recent violent fluctuations in the exchanges; second, the
large volume and short maturity of the floating debt. At the
end of 1924 the floating debt was about 6o milliard francs, of
'which the main constituent was the Bons de Ia Defense Na-
tionale. Of these, 54,538 million were outstanding in Decem-
ber of which 7 to 8 milliard matured each month. In
addition, from July 1925 to May 1926 bonds amounting to
27½ milliard francs were maturing. The public was therefore
in a ])OsitiOfl to force the government to borrow from the
Bank of France if for any reason it was unwilling to renew the
government's maturing debt.8 The defeat of Poincaré and
his replacement as Premier by M. Herriot, by increasing the
nervousness and distrust of financial interests in the economic
policies of the government, did in fact lead to the exercise of
this power. Toward the end of 1924 and in the beginning of
1925 the circulation of Bons de la Defense National was sub-
stantially reduced. The legal limit of borrowings at the Bank
of France by the state was also reduced under the Law of
December 31, 1920, and in April 1925, at the very moment
when. England was returning to the gold standard, the Her-
riot government was obliged to admit that this legal limit
had been exceeded and this excess borrowing concealed in
the published balance sheets of the Bank.° Miss Dulles states
that these concealed borrowings approximately equaled the
entire reduction in advances actually made under the Law
Dulles,op. cit., table p. i86. & Cf. Ch. 14, Italy, pp. 429—30.
A ministerial crisis was provoked on Aprilover the question of increasing
the note circulation of the Bank of France and M. de Monzie supplanted
M. Clementel as finance minister; Dulles, op. cit., p. i8z.438 EXPERIMENTATION
of December 31, 1920.10 These disclosures revealed the degree
to which the Genoa principle of an independent central bank
had been undermined by the peculiar form of political eco-
nomics that prevailed in France from igig to 1924. They also
inaugurated a new and severe series of currency crises.
Laying the Foundations for Future Power in the Gold
Standard System, 1925—1926
One of the most striking paradoxes of post-war gold standard
history is that during this series of financial crises the founda-
tions were firmly laid for the assumption by France of a role
in the gold standard world such as she had not enjoyed at any
previous period i.n her history. The paradox is resolved by a
consideration of the peculiar characteristics of the moderate
inflation that took place in France at this time and of certain
institutional elements in the French money market.
Inflation, 1925—1926
The remedy proposed by the Herriot government in April
1925 for the acute French budget problem was a capital levy
or forced loan. This measure was bitterly opposed, and when
the condition of the balance sheet of the Bank of France was
revealed in April the Herriot ministry was obliged to resign.
M. Caillaux became Finance Minister in a Briand cabinet.
His two most important measures to meet the situation were
first, to consolidate the floating debt by an internal loan bear-
ing an interest rate varying with the French exchange on
London; second, to obtain further credits in America in con-
nection with the settlement of the Franco-American war debt.
The internal loan failed to achieve the hoped for results,
10Cf.op. cit., p.232,and charts, pp. 233, 236—7.MissDulles states that the
most common method of concealment was for the government to borrow
directly from the private banks and to force the Bank of France to rediscount
for them the treasury certificates they had received. This suggests a reason
for the stiff attitude of M. Moret toward rediscounting treasury bills in
1933—34 which caused the government to borrow Lao million in London in
1933 and eventually led to M. Moret's retirement in favor of M. Tannery.'FABLE 35
FrenchGovernment Short Term Debt and Certain Balance Sheet Items
theBan/c of France, 1924-1926(millionsof francs)
AEONS DELA DSENSE NATIONALE OUTSTANDING, AND ADVANCES TO
THE STATE AND NOTE ISSUE OP THE BANK OF FRANCE, 1924-1926,
MONTHLY
BONS DR LA DÜFENSE ADVANCES BY THE NOTE ISSUE OF
NATIONALE OUTSTANDING1 BANK TO THESTATE2 THE BANK3
1924 1925 £926 1924 1925 1926 192419251926
Jan.54,88954,88646,08922,84021,520 34,85038,825 40,726
Feb.54,68254,99246,06823,00021,900 34,46239,083 40,799 50,878
March 54,55253,94545,78322,92521,825 35,35040,012 40,882 51,802
April56,19452,24646,21222,80022,44035,71040,031 42,515 52,329
May56,78051,24546,38422,78023,938 35,27539,729 42,962 52,809
June56,34350,56946,15723,00025,325 36,57539,817 43,272 53,212
July56,28750,69044,21822,94027,520 37,73040,188 44,308 54,945
Aug.56,59850,330 22,90028,013 37,13740,314 44,931 56,084
Sept.57,18051,2024b,85023,02528,787 36,85040,32445,575 55,047
Oct.57,18146,62345,88622,84030,390 36,28840,547 46,74155,248
Nov.57,04545,57148,54222,90031,575 36,03740,579 47,930 54,476
Dec.54,53845,73549,07922,67534,360 36,46040,597 49,873 52,866
Changes Cumulated Mont/il,
Jan. 0 —3 —8,8oo 0—1,32012,010 07,901 12,361
Feb. —207 103 —8,827 i6o—940 11,622 2587,97412,053
March—337—944 —9,1o6 85 —1,01512,5101,1872,057 12,977
April 1,305—2,643—8,677 —40—40012,880 1,2063,690 '3,504
May i,8gz—3,644 —6o 1,098 12,435 9044,137 13,982
June 1,454—4,320 —8,732 i6o2,485 13,735 9924,44714,387
July 1,398 —4,199 —io,67z 1004,68014,8901,3635,483 16,120
Aug. 1,709 —8,gi6 6o 5,17374,2971,4896,xo6 17,259
Sept. 2,291—3,b87—8,039 5,947 14,0101,499 16,222
Oct.2,292 —8,266 —9,003 07,550 13,4881,7227,91616,423
Nov. 2,156—9,318—6,347 6o8,735 13,1971,754
Dec. —351—9,154 11,520 13,6201,772 11,048 14,041
BLEGAL LIMIT OF ADVANCES BY THE CLEGALLIMITOF
BANK OP PRANCE TO THE STATE NOTE ISSUE OF THE
BANKOF FRANCE
1923 1925 1920
Dec.2723,200 April75 26,000 Sept. 28 41,000
June 30 32,000
1924 Nov. 2433,500 £925




E. L. Dulles, The French Franc, 1914-1929,p.i86. Miss Dulles' table does not state
whether the figures are for the beginning of the month, the end of the month, or
are averages.
2 of Bank of France weekly figures compiled from Dulles, op. cit., tables,
pp.489-90.
pp. 485-6. Ibid., table, p. 232.440 EXPERIMENTATION
though by October it had brought in 6 milliard francs." In
that month the negotiations in Washington collapsed, Gail-
laux was forced to resign, and a turning point in the long
crisis was reached.
The major characteristics of the crisis up to this point may'
CHART 26
Influence of Changes in the
French Government Short
Term Debt upon the Bank of
France, 1924-1926,monthly
C
beeasily summarized. The inadequacy of the government's
revenue was not very great, the increase in the public debt
for 1925 being only 3 milliard francs. It was however sufficient
to undermine confidence in the ability of any political combi-
nation to deal successfully with the budget problem. This loss
of confidence impaired further the government's ability to
deal with the floating debt. The failure to renew in sufficient
volume floating debt as it matured led to increases in the
legal limits up to which the Bank of France could make ad-
vances to the state and issue notes. This was a conspicuous
visible sign of inflation. It exaggerated the true dimensions
of the problem and was perfectly calculated to undermine
still further the confidence of the general public and to dis-
courage subscriptions to the Bons.
These relationships are shown in Chart 26 in which the
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Bonsde la Defense Nationale outstanding, Bank of France ad-
vancestothe state, and Bank of France note issue are plotted,12
together with the legal limits of advances and note issue. In
Chart 27 the cumulative changes in these series from January
[924 are shown in order to bring out the fidelity with which
CHART27
Bans d9 la D?ense .Nationale
Outstanding, and Advances
to the State and Xote Issue of
the Bank of France, 1924-
1926, changescumulated
mon elily
the Bank of France items reflected the decline in the outstand-
ing Bons during 1925. The budget difficulties wereaccom-
panied by a rapid expansion of bank credit and a moderate
rise in wholesale prices and the cost of living. Meanwhile the
franc was gradually yielding to the pressure ofa persistent
transfer of capital from France which often took the form of
French purchases of securities payable in gold, suchas Suez
Canal, Rio Tinto, and DeBeers, and British and American
bonds. This decline was at times checked by officialsupport
which helped to keep the New York rate at approximately
5.18 during March, April, and May, and at approximately
4.70 (luring July, August, and September.
All these tendencies were sharply accentuated by the failure
of M. Caillaux' measures in October 1925. The legal limit of
'advances to the state' by the Bank had to be raised twice in
quick. succession, and a further increase in the legal maximum
of note issue was made. M. Caillaux was succeeded as Finance
12Inthis chart the figures graphically presented by Miss Dulles in her charts





Minister first by M. Painlevé and then by M. Loucheur.
Though further restrictions were placed upon the export of
capital in October the temporary pegging of the franc was
followed by a rapid decline. The monthly average rate on
New York for September was 4.71 cents, for October4.43
cents, and for December 3.74 cents. In December the crisis
became very acute and M. Loucheur was able to force through
the Chamber a measure of emergency taxation calculated to
raise about3 milliard francs almost at once. Confidence, how-
ever, was not restored. The government was saved only by an
impassioned appeal by Briand in the Chamber, and the crisis
continued under successive finance ministers, reaching its
peak in July 1926 when Caillaux, recalled to office on June
25, was refused the dictatorial financial powers he demanded.
This led to the fall of the Briand-Caillaux ministry on July 17.
OnJune 26 M. Caillaux had appointed Emile Moreau as
Governor of the Bank of France, and just before the fall of
the ministry he had asked the Bank to purchase from the
Treasury the balance of the Morgan loan, $31million,still
remaining in the government's hands. On July 19theBank
of France agreed on condition that the legal limit of its note
circulation be increased by a corresponding amount, about
Goo million francs. The formation of a new ministry with
M. Flerriot as Premier and M. de Monzie again as Finance
Minister was completed the next morning. This ministry was
unwilling either to stop the drain on the Treasury caused by
the redemption of short term Bons by a forced funding of the
Bons or to give public notice of an inflationary policy by
consenting to an increase in the legal limit of the note circula-
tion. M. Moreau, however, was adamant in his refusal to pur-
chase the balance of the Morgan loan without an increase in
the legal limit, and in his resolve to force the government to
disclose publicly the bad situation of the Treasury and to pre-
vent it from escaping this necessity by recourse to "illegal
subterfuges." On July 2 i he addressed the following letter to
M. de Monzie (italics M. Moreau's):COMPLETING THE FACADE 443
July 21, 1926
M. le Ministre:
As I had the honor to inform you orally yesterday the position of
the Treasury's account at the Bank grew still worse yesterday.
The margin still legally available to the Treasury is this morn-
ing reduced to 6o million francs.
It is to be feared that it will be completely exhausted today,
and that our weekly statement, which will be made up tonight
and published tomorrow, will show an excess of advances to the
state over the legal limit which will oblige the Bank to cease mak-
ing payments everywhere for the account of the Treasury.
In order to furnish the Treasury with immediate funds, while
awaiting the effect of proposed measures, your predecessor pro-
posed the transfer of the unutilized balances of the Morgan loan
to the Bank. I advised him in my letter of July '9 that the general
council 'of the Bank would consent to this operation, under con-
ditions stated in that letter, as soon as Parliamentary authority
was obtained.
Without prejudice to the measures which it is the government's
province to take to assure the regular supply of the Treasury in
the immediate future, and unless your department has at its corn-
mand immediately available resources which it might obtain, for
example,. by the discount of a part of its portfolio, I believe that
the only means of avoiding the pub lication tomorrow of a debit
balancethe Account of the Treasury at the Bank and the sus-
pension of payments, which would be its inevitable consequence,
is the approval this very day, by both Chambers, of the proposed
transfer of foreign exchange.
Accept etc.,
Emile Moreau
The Treasury did not show a debit that day, and the gov-
ernment in the evening submitted to the Committee of the
Chambe:r a bill to sell the Morgan balance to the Bank with-
out raising the limit of the circulation. M. Moreau immedi-
ately wrote to the Premier that the Bank of France would
noi: yield,18 but the Premier's Declaration to the Chamber that
Emile NEoreau, 'Le Relévement Financier et Monétaire de la France,
1926—28,' Revue de Deux Mondes, March i, 1937, pp.444 EXPERIMENTATION
night contained the explicit statement that he would not ask
for an increase in the note issue. The government, however,
was overthrown, without ever having obtained a vote of con-
fidence on its general policy, including heavy capital taxes.
At a special session of both chambers immediately following
the fall of the ministry a bill embodying the Bank's terms was
passed into law.
During this crisis prices were rising rapidly and unemploy-
ment suddenly increased. The franc fell to 243 to the pound
and to 2.05 cents to the franc on July 21. Assistance from the
United States in stabilizing the franc was not to be had, as
M. Moreau learned from Governor Strong at two conferences
with him at Versailles during the height of the crisis, unless
the French war debt agreement with the United States was
ratified.'4 It seemed, for the moment, as if France was in-
capable under the existing form of government of solving her
financial problems.
Elements of Potential Strength developed during Inflation
Throughout this troubled period, however, France was forg-
ing certain weapons with which to extricate herself from its
culminating phases, and with which to play a great role in
the gold standard world.
First, the transfer of French capital abroad, which had for
years contributed to the weakness of the franc, was not in the
main a speculative movement. Lack of confidence in French
securities had resulted in a fall in their price and a restriction
of new French securities offered for sale. Savings that would
normally have gone into French securities were transferred
abroad.'5 Foreign assets were accumulated that would be
drawn upon surely but gradually as need arose or opportunity
developed for profitable employment or investment of funds
in France. This was all the more certain because the French
appetite for permanent investment abroad had been dulled
'4lbid., pp.56—7,62.
lbCf.Hawtrey, cit.,pp. 22—5.Mr.Hawtrey here discusses the concepts,
flight, and repatriation of capital.COMPLETING THE FACADE 445
by the great losses suffered on pre-war French foreign invest-
ments. The export of French capital was not only non-specula-
tive and temporary, but also formidable in amount, and a
reversal of the movement was bound to be a powerful factor
in the exchange market.
Second, the depreciation of the franc was sufficiently favor-
able to French exports to facilitate this export of capital and
the simultaneous movement of short term funds and balances
of a speculative character, and to give, in combination with
the French reluctance to make new permanent foreign in-
vestments, promise of a favorable balance of payments once
the pressure of capital flight was relieved.
Third, the chronic condition of crisis had forced the im-
position of new taxes in 1920, 1924, and 1925 adequate to
meet the basic budget difficulty in combination with the
Dawes Plan annuities.
Fourth, the fall of the franc made it possible to abandon the
idea of a 'return to normal' and to choose a new rate of
stabilization under plea of absolute necessity.
Fifth, the fact that the fall of the franc in the exchange
markets, particularly during the acute phases of the 1926
crisis, was more rapid than the rise in prices, made it pos-
sible, without additional shock to public confidence, to fix
upon a rate that undervalued the franc and to avoid a pro-
longed post-stabilization policy of deflation.
Si:Kth, the crisis forced political unity upon the country in
the form of a government of national union under M. Poin-
care., who took office on July 24, 1926 at a moment when fi-
nancial chaos had brought France to the brink of revolution.
Without such political unity no ministry could have met the
crisis successfully.
Finally, it produced, in the report of a committee of ex-
perts (the Sergent Committee) appointed by M. Briand on
May 21, 1926, a simple and technically effective plan of
stabilization by which advantage could be taken of all the
potential elements of strength in the French position.446
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De Facto Adherence to the Gold Exchange Standard,
August 1926 to June 1928, and the Realization of the
Potential Elements of Strength
This plan, which was submitted on July 3, proposed three
stages of stabilization:(1)tostop inflation while letting the
franc fluctuate; (2) de facto stabilization; dejure stabili-
zation. It suggested that the rate of stabilization be between
the rate appropriate to the wholesale price index and that ap-
propriate to the cost of living index. It suggested two methods
of dealing with the budget problem: first, further taxes—a
final attack upon the underlying disturbing cause; second, a
special allocation of revenue to a new government body, the
Caisse d'Amortissement, responsible for the refunding and ad-
ministration of the floating debt—a final attack upon the
major secondary cause of disturbance. Finally,it recom-
mended a technical change of great importance, namely, to
grant to the Bank of France the right to buy gold and foreign
exchange at a premium and to issue notes against these assets
without having to include them within the legal maximum
of note issue. This recommendation put France de facto upon
the gold exchange standard.
M. Herriot was succeeded as Premier by Raymond Poin-
care. The balance of the Morgan loan was placed at the dis-
posal of the Treasury in francs and M. Poincaré took vigorous
steps to give legislative effect to the recommendations of the
Sergent Committee concerning the budget and the Bank of
France. The franc recovered immediately. By November it
was 31/2 cents and by December approximately 4 cents in
New York. The new powers of the Bank of France were little
used. Some gold was enticed out of hoarding by the offer of
a premium on September 27, but in the main the Bank was
passive. In December 1926 de facto stabilization was begun.
The Bank of France bought dollars from all comers at not
over 4 cents per franc, and pounds at not less than 122 francs
per pound. The large amount of foreign exchange offered atCOMPLETING THE FACADE 447
these rates, together with the freedom to decide whether and
in what markets this foreign exchange should be converted
into gold, and if not so converted, to determine in what mar-
kets and in what forms it should be employed, gave the Bank
great powers in the decentralized post-war gold standard sys-
tem. The degree and permanence of these powers depended
upon the sources from which sprang the large offers of foreign
e:Kchange to the Bank. This was the root question for France
as a gold standard power.
The international position of France during the period of
de facto adherence to the gold exchange standard is sum-
rriarizecl in a document prepared for the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements by Dr. Blessing in October 1932: 16
"Thestabilization rate selected by France fixed the level of prices
in that country below the price level in other countries with a
gold currency. In consequence of this and of other circumstances
(reimbursement of the State debt to the Banque de France by
the French Treasury and the Caisse d'Amortissement, operations
which, until about the middle of 1927, in effect counteracted the
notes issued by the Banque de France against foreign exchange;
disinclination of the French banks to develop French credit on
a basis of the growing gold and foreign exchange holdings of the
Banque de France and to increase their calls on the Banque de
France; measures of customs policy which impeded the impor-
tation of commodities, thus obstructing the normal outflow of
gold and exchange) France had an extraordinarily favourable
balance of payments during the de facto stabilisation and in the
years following the de jure stabilisation. Owing to the mentality
of the F:rench public, political unrest and a system of tax legisla-
tion which for a time stood in the way of the issue of long term
fo:reign loans on the French market, it was not possible for the
excess of assets over liabilities in the French balance of payments
to be placed at the disposal of foreign countries in the form of
long termloans, as it was before the War. The Banque cle France
was accordingly compelled to take over this surplus in the form
of either exchange or gold, against the issue of notes. In the period
16The Gold Exchange Standard, B.I.S. Monetary and Economic Department
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from the end of 1926 to the middle of 1928 (from the de facto to
the de juTe stabilisation of the franc), during which France ap-
plied the pure gold exchange standard, the Banque de France
purchased almost exclusively foreign exchange. By the date of the
legal stabilisation (June 25, 1928)its foreign exchange holding
had risen to 26.5 milliard francs. This rapid rise was due—apart
from the current favourable balance of payments—to the repatria-
tion of emigrated capital and to foreign speculation in francs and
in French securities. After the legal stabilisation, the funds loaned
to France for speculative purposes were withdrawn, the with-
drawals being, however, easily made good out of amounts coming
into the country in respect of the current balance of payments."
In this summary stress is laid upon the fact that the with-
drawal of funds from circulation by the government for the
repayment of advances to the Bank of France served to cancel
an increase in notes in circulation arising from Bank of France
purchases of gold and foreign exchange, which, by implica-
tion, might otherwise have eliminated the special stimulus to
French exports gained by the low rate of stabilization by
causing prices to rise. Mr. Hawtrey has shown 17thatthe with-
drawal of notes from circulation by the government, looked
at in another way, directly promoted the French export sur-
plus which brought exchange to the Bank and made possible
the replacement of the notes withdrawn by the government.
There was a double relation of cause and effect. Mr. Hawtrey's
analysis has the great merit of bringing out the grave economic
consequences of certain institutional factors in the organiza-
tion of the French banking system and the French money
market. Our studies have consistently sought to emphasize
considerations of this type, and it is therefore appropriate to
repeat the main points in his analysis:
When Poincaré took office in July 1926 the French Bank
rate and market rate were both high, the former being 71,4
percent. It, however, soon became ineffective because of a
shortage of commercial bills in the French market which
17op.cit., pp.13—25.COMPLETING THE FACADE 449
causeda sharp decline in bills discounted at the Bank of
France. These fell from 7,864 million francs to 3,604 million
in one month. By June 1927, when all the very short term
Bons had been retired, discounts at the Bank of France were
only 2 milliard francs, Bank rate had been reduced to 5 per
cent and the market rate was only 2 per cent, but the long
term rate of interest was still high. The decline in discounts
reduced the note circulation of the Bank of France, and the
shortage of commercial bills which caused it put the banks in
a diflicult position with respect to their secondary reserves.
Mr. Hawtrey stresses the fact that as a consequence the gov-
ernment's attempts to refund and to reduce the floating debt
met with unequal success. First, the one-month maturities
were retired, and then those of three and six months, until
only two-year Bons de la Defense Nationale were left out-
standing. The refunding was successful but the effort to re-
duce the debt was unsuccessful because the banks had to have
prime short term assets for portfolio purposes, and in the ab-
sence of bills continued to buy Bons. The Caisse d'Amor-
tissernent, meanwhile, continued to receive the revenues as-
signed to it, but, being unable to use them to pay off Bons,
accumulated large balances at the Bank of France. Bank of
France notes in circulation were therefore still further re-
duced. In addition, other Treasury deposits were built up by
the inflow of other revenue, and the government further in-
creased its deposits by offering special interest inducements
to the banks to keep deposits with the Treasury. These re-
sources were used partly to reduce debt held by the public
other than floating debt, but also partly to reduce advances
by the Bank of France. Mr. Hawtrey concludes therefore that
there was within France a deflationary force of large propor-
tions that reduced domestic expenditures, including expendi-
ture on exportable goods, on imports, and on foreign invest-
ments, and also a strong motive for the sale of foreign assets
temporarily held abroad as a means of replenishing depleted
balances in France. These internal pressures therefore corn-450 EXPERIMENTATION
bined to swell the favorable balance of payments of France,
but because they were relieved by the pegging of the franc,
they did not become strong enough to cause a severe deflation.
After the de facto stabilization the favorable French balance
of payments could no longer express itself in rising rates of
exchange, but built up the balances of French banks abroad.
The primary reserves of these banks were being reduced by
the forces tending to contract the French note circulation,
and the cheapest way to build them up was to sell foreign ex-
change to the Bank of France, rather than to borrow from it.
Consequently large purchases of foreign exchange were made
by the Bank of France against which notes were issued under
its new technical powers. A gap of 18 milliard francs made in
the circulation by the government was filled by August 1927
by i 8 milliard francs of notes issued against foreign exchange.
Thereafter the Bank of France tried to prevent further note
issues in connection with further purchases of foreign ex-
change by purchasing forward exchange. This could be only
a temporary expedient, for as the forward contracts fell due
they had perpetually to be renewed as long as the underlying
forces continued.'8
These various economic pressures tending to strengthen the
franc in foreign markets, especially in London, were rein-
forced by the attraction of relatively high long term interest
rates in Paris and relatively low rates in London and Berlin,
and by speculative purchases based on the certainty that the
franc would not fall, but might rise.19
The Bank of France, however, in order to avoid the ad-
verse and deflationary effects of such a rise on the French
economy, was determined not to permit further appreciation
of the franc. By February1927 its 'working fund' (masse
18 Ibid., p. iS.
'° Cf. the causes leading to the large movement of gold into India in 1925,
Ch. 23, The Influence of World-wide Deflationary Forces on Indian Demand
for Gold and Silver, and Ch. 12, The End of the Regular Pattern of Cold
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demanoeuvre) in foreign exchange amounted to £22 million
(2,750 million francs) •20 The Bank was already planning for
a definitive stabilization, and as a preliminary wished to free
its balance sheet of all doubtful items, chief among them the
item 'gold held abroad.' At that time this item was regulated
by an. agreement made in 1923 that had given the French
Treasury an extension of its war-time British credits but had
suspended the original arrangement whereby as these credits
were repaid the gold pledged by the Bank of France as secu-
rity was to be returned proportionately. After arduous nego-
tiations, the French contentions prevailed,21 and in April the
government was able to pay off the residue of its war-time loan
amounting to £33 million, thus releasing £i8 million of
pledged gold belonging to the Bank of France, and also to
accumulate a large fund of dollars in New York to meet pay-
ments that would fall due in the United States if the pending
war debt settlements were not ratified. The building up of
dollar balances in New York was facilitated by the shipment
of the gold released from pledge in London to America.22 The
franc continued to be very strong and by May io, 1927, the
Bank of France held in foreign exchange the equivalent of
£ioo million sterling (121,4 milliard francs).
According to the estimates of J. M. Keynes French balances
in London grew £ioo million during 1925, 1926, and 1927.23
TheBank of France was acquiring balances from sellers of
all sorts, British and continental, and also from other French
holders of sterling. The passage of an increasingly large pro-
portion of the total of French balances abroad to the Bank
of France and. other French banks from those who had ac-
20 Moreau, op. cit.,p. 300. 21 ibid.,pp.298—319.
22Albert Aftalion, 'The Causes and Effects of the Movements of Gold into
France,' Selected Documents of the Gold Delegation(Geneva, League of
Nations, 1931), p.71.
23 'The British Balance of Payments 1925—27,'EconomicJournal, Dec. 1927,
p. 556.452 EXPERIMENTATION
quired them by the export of French goods or capital was of
the greatest significance for all international money markets.
It was a concerted transfer of French credits previously ac-
cumulated and currently accumulating abroad into the hands
of those who were bound to employ them at short term, in-
stead of their transfer into the hands of permanent investors
in foreign securities. It contributed substantially to the fric-
tion that impeded the free flow of capital in London and
New York from long to short term
24andthe
international equalization of interest rates in the long and
short term markets and led to competitive bidding by banks
in London and New York for French funds and thereby con-
tributed to pressure on these markets to find outlets for such
funds in Germany and other capital-poor countries. It was
also a source of embarrassment Co the Bank of France which
was being subjected to an active propaganda at home to force
it to allow the exchange to appreciate. The Bank therefore
was very anxious to secure a de jure stabilization as soon as
possible and M. Moreau tried to persuade President Dou-
mergue and M. Poincaré to advance the date of the French
elections, scheduled for May 1928, in order to hasten a de-
cision on this matter. This effort was unsuccessful, and the de
facto stabilization had to be continued.
Under these circumstances the Bank of France, in May
1927,beganto buy gold in London. Its purpose was to restrict
credit in the London market, force an increase in interest
rates there, and thus make speculation for the rise in francs
more expensive and less attractive. It began to act, as Charles
lUst, its vice-governor, was soon to point out to the Governor
of the Bank of England, as if the gold standard were in effect
in France. This observation was made at the close of an
interview in Paris on May 27 between Messrs. Norman and
Siepman of the Bank of England and MM. Moreau and Rist
of the Bank of France concerning the French gold purchases.
24Cl.Ch. '8, An Improvised Institutional Equipment.COMPLETING THE FACADE 453
The Moreau-Norznan Conversations of May 1927
M. Moreau's account of these conversations in the Revue de
Deux Mondes25 gives the background for an understanding
of the action taken by a meeting of central bankers in New
York the following month which was of outstanding impor-
tance in the history of the international gold standard during
the Experimentation period. He records his own exposition
of the French position as follows:
"The sales of foreign exchange, pounds sterling especially, to Paris
have reached considerable amounts. The high interest rate and
the prospect of a revaluation of the currency are attracting not
only French funds exported abroad, but foreign funds also, of
which the greater part are borrowed to speculate with on our
market.
These heavy receipts of foreign exchange on the French market
have unquestionable advantages, for they make it possible to put
the fi:nancial situation in order; but they have the serious disad-
vantage of frightening a section of the public and playing into
the hands of those who want to revalue the franc. If this inflow of
foreign exchange continues, the pressure of the revaluers to in-
duce the Bank to cease its purchases and so allow a revaluation
of the franc to take place will be increased. We wish to avoid
such an eventuality; at least for the moment.
The measures taken on the Paris market (alteration in the
buying price of foreign exchange for example) are for this pur-
pose. But to achieve the desired result we must act abroad also.
For the employment abroad by the Bank of France of the foreign
exchange it has bought leaves the sums offered to Paris at the
disposition of foreign markets, and, by a circuit that can easily
be imagined,28 facilitates the continuation of the movement.
25Loc. cit., April t, pp.550—61.
26 Professor Aftalion describesthis "circuit"inthe following terms(op.
cit., p.8):
"AfterDecember 25,1926,when it was decided to stabilize the franc de facto
and theBanquede France began to purchase foreign exchange at fixed
prices, many Frenchmen brought their capital back into the country—that
is to say they handed over their foreign exchange to the Banque de France
in return for francs. The French holding of foreign exchange then passed
in successive stages into the hands of the Banque de France.454 EXPERIMENTATION
Further, certain continental markets with too low interest rates
have allowed their capital to move to Paris and have even given
credits. M. Bruins, the Dutch member of the Administrative
Council of the Reichsbank has informed me that Berlin has lost
a milliard gold marks (E5o million) in foreign exchange reserve
in the past few months. The speculation there was financed by
foreign credits.27
This speculation is adverse to our interest and must be stopped.
However reluctant Berlin is to bring home its foreign assets, and
so to facilitate the transfer of reparations at a moment when
Germany wishes to prepare opinion for a revision of the Dawes
Plan, the Reichsbank should raise its discount rate and recall its
funds. Other markets should imitate it. These great international
movements of speculative capital must be stopped, and a lesson
must be taught to these modern freebooters(capitaines de
grandes compagnies) who, with their gangs, have exhausted one
Other large quantities of foreign exchange were handed over to the Banque
de France in return for francs by foreign capitalists speculating, first on the
rise of the franc, and later on the rise of French securities which they pur-
chased with the francs they received.
Fed from these two sources the foreign exchange holdings of the Banque
de France continued to grow. The Banque de France placed this foreign ex-
change in other countries thus returning to foreigners the capital which it
had just received from them. The latter were thus enabled to bring itto
the Bank once more, and as the Bank in its turn again placed these sums
abroad, there was nothing to prevent this cycle of operations with the same
capital from continuing indefinitely, swelling the Bank's holdings immoder-
ately and producing inflation twice over—in France by reason of the francs
given by the Bank in return for the foreign exchange, and in other countries
by reason of the investments of foreign exchange effected there by the Bank.
This was one of the reasons which led the Banque de France to exchange
a part of its foreign exchange in other countries for gold. By purchasing gold
it reduced its foreign investments, and diminished the multiplication of capi-
tal which has been described."
Professor Al talion seems here to have discovered the secret of perpetual mo-
tion. It is not dear to the writer, however, why the 'placement' of, let us say,
dollar funds by the Bank of France in America should inspire those who have
sold, let us say, acceptances to the Bank to go straightway and buy francs.
The transfer of French capital home was indeed the transfer of a finite amount
not capable of being multiplied in this way. The connection, however, be-
tween the Bank's purchases of short term instruments, easy money abroad,
and speculation in francs was undoubtedly a real one.
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market after another. Paris cannot act against them directly for
their transactions are not really in marks, forms or crowns, but in
pounds and dollars. Paris finds that it has acquired considerable
power over London and New York, but not over Berlin and Am-
sterdam. It is quite clear, at any rate, that London and New York
must have acquired simultaneously assets in the markets which
have sold their own currencies to get the pounds and dollars they
have sold in Paris.
Therefore London and New York should use their powers by
falling back on the markets where the movement originates. The
Bank of France could force them to do so. By converting her
rounds and other foreign currencies into gold, she would oblige
London, in self-defense, to realize its assets in Berlin. To conserve
its cash or to attract funds to replace the withdrawn English cred-
its, BerEin would have to raise its rates.
But the Bank of France does not want to use this pressure on
London. Though obliged to strangle speculation, it prefers not
to have to draw on London. Let the English be the first to draw,
of their own accord, on Central Europe, and the desired result
will be achieved by a completely frank collaboration without dis-
turbing intermediate markets.
In conclusion I said that the role of international clearing
house gives great advantages to a market, the London market in
this case, but that it also implies duties. Mr. Norman would
understand that the better, since he has no interest in seeing the
Bank of France enjoy an excessive power in his market as it does
at present."
In reply to this exposition Mr. Norman made the following
points:
i)Dr.Schacht's policy in Berlin was not entirely based on po-
litical considerations. The Berlin market had just gone through
a wild speculation while Germans were at the same time specu-
lating abroad and drawing reserves from the Reichsbank. But
Schacht could not raise his rate and recall German foreign bal-
artces without attracting more American credits and facilitating
further speculation in Germany.
2)IfGerman speculation could be checked Dr. Schacht would
raise the Reichsbank rate, but Mr. Norman would not urge him to456 EXPERIMENTATION
do so now. Even if he did it was doubtful if German funds would
be attracted home.
3) The trouble was more in Paris than in other markets. The
power of Paris to attract funds is due to the following circum-
stances: a currency guaranteed against any decline, but with the
possibility of a rise left open; a long term interest rate higher than
anywhere else in the world in a great confidence inspiring country
whose government has too often undertaken not to refund its
debt for several years; refusal to borrow abroad or to allow the
great public companies (collectivités) to borrow abroad, another
check to the decline in interest rates; the wish of private com-
panies to prevent the inevitable rise in their shares in order not
to have to raise dividends, while foreigners are convinced that
French securities will rise. Never have conditions been so favor-
able for the attraction of capital—"61/2 per cent for life, and the
prospect of a possible large profit from currency revaluation!"
Therefore at all costs quotations on the Bourse should be allowed
to rise and the French rate of interest should be reduced.
4) London has not acquired any power over third markets by
the concentration of London balances in French hands, for what
has happened is a transfer of prime sterling bills already held by
foreigners in London to the Bank of France. No change in the
composition of its portfolio by the Bank of England could help,
as its assets were invested in the same type of asset as is held in
London by the Bank of France. A contraction of credit in London
was not practical, as the amount of credit outstanding was finely
adjusted to the needs of the British economy.
5) To help the French, Mr. Norman had nevertheless tightened
the London market rate of interest by selling securities at 31%6
percent and then at per cent. The market which had ex-
pected a reduction of Bank rate from 4 per cent had fol-
lowed (Chart 48). Mr. Norman was willing to maintain the
market rate at 41/8,andhad even thought of raising it to but
the ability of the Treasury to sell treasury bills would be en-
dangered if the margin between Bank rate and market rate be-
came too slight.
6) Mr. Norman sincerely believed he could not raise the Bank of
England rate by a full one per cent, the customary practice, with-
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immobilized 54 per cent of their assets in loans to industry which
could not do without these credits even if Bank rate went to io
per cent. And the banks would not lend more even if Bank rate
went to 2 per cent. Paris could force the Bank of England to raise
its rate, but he would not raise it on his own responsibility alone.
Perhaps in a few weeks a different psychological situation would
permit him to do so.
7)If the Bank of France took gold from the Bank of England it
would. not thereby restrict credit in London, for the Bank of Eng-
land would return the sterling to the market. Such purchases
would. reduce the proportion of the Bank and threaten the gold
standard in England.28
M. Moreau summed up Mr. Norman's position as follows:
he would not raise the Bank of England rate, he was not in-
clined to press Dr. Schacht to raise the Reichsbank rate, and
French purchases of gold in London wou]d endanger the gold
standard in Great Britain.
M. Moreau replied to Mr. Norman that the French gold
purchases had already modified the speculation in the franc
and that he did not wish to seem to abandon them. He there-
fore intended to continue to buy gold in New York, and in
order not to inconvenience Mr. Norman requested him to
buy for the Bank of France all the gold that came into the
free market in London. Since none was coming forward the
next 'week, he expressed a wish to take a further million or
half million pounds in gold from the Bank of England on the
day following any exceptionally heavy offer of foreign ex-
change to the Bank of France.
Finally M. Moreau and Mr. Norman agreed on a program
of cooperation to control and defend both markets, to co-
ordinate British and French interests on the war debt and
reparation questions, and to restore the finances of various
European countries.
Though the technical officials of the Bank of France con-
tinued to press for gold purchases in London to tighten that
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market, M. Moreau felt more strongly inclined after this
interview to exercise moderation, not to throw the pound
sterling to earth, and, incidentally, to avoid further reproaches
from America. This conversation was in fact the immediate
forerunner of a vitally important conference of central bank-
ers in New York which enlisted American cooperation in the
program of diverting French gold demand from London, and
relieving London of other
During the rest of 1927 and the first six months of 1928 the
Bank of France bought gold steadily abroad. Mr. Hawtrey
estimates its purchases between December 1926 and June
1928 at 7 milliard francs.8° The item 'divers' in its balance
sheet grew from 5,010 million francs on December 1926
to 26,551 million francs on December 29, 1927. The total in-
crease in its foreign exchange holdings during the de facto
stabilization was first revealed in the balance sheet of June
25, 1928 which showed foreign exchange held at 26,529
million francs, in addition to 9,778 million francs in forward
contracts carried as a contra-entry.
The De Jure Stabilization of June 1928 and its
Technical Heritage
The foreign exchange holdings of the Bank of France on
June 25, included substantial amounts which it had had
to buy to maintain the de facto stabilization immediately after
the Parliamentary elections of May 1, 1928. Hopes that stabili-
zation would be abandoned and be replaced by revalorization
had been strengthened, and the feeling that national honor
was involved in a return to par, which had beefl so decisive
in the basic decisions of British currency policy (cf. Ch.
wasstrong in the highest French quarters. M. Moreau had
the greatest difficulty in overcoming this feeling in MM.
Poincaré, Herriot, Mann, and Briand, among the Ministers,
and Baron Rothschild and M. de Wendel, among the Regents
29Cf.Ch. iS, The Critical Decisions of 1927intheir Inflationary Setting.
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of the Bank of France. The latter two were opposed to de
jure stabilization at the de facto rate of 125tothe pound.
M. Moreau carried the other Regents with him, however, and
even threatened to resign if immediate stabilization were not
voted.. After a short but severe struggle,3' the advocates of
stabilization were successful. The defenders of revalorization
were fighting a rear-guard action, for the French public was
alread.y accustomed to the new rates of exchange. The psycho-
Logical barriers to devaluation arising from the attitude of the
Large rentier class were weakened. The losses of this class had
over many years been gradually distributed by the turnover
of the French public debt among individuals. All that re-
inained to be done was to recognize officially an accomplished
fact. There was no danger that the new rate could not be
held. The stabilization crisis of 1926 had been mild and was
already in the past. Government resources were ample for all
needs, and no technical obstacle stood in the way of a transi-
tion to a gold bullion standard.
The Law and the Conventions
rrhis transition was accomplished by three Conventions con-
cluded between the government and the Bank of France; the
government and the Caisse d'Amortissement; and the Bank
of France and the Caisse d'Amortissement—all dated June 23
and all approved by the Law of June 25, 1928.
This law defined the franc as 65.5 milligrams of gold 9/to
fine (Art. 2). It repealed the Law of August 7, 1926 which
permitted the Bank of France to purchase gold at a premium
and to buy foreign exchange in the open market (Art. 2). It
imposed upon the Bank the obligation to buy all gold offered
to it at one franc for 65.5 milligrams of gold 9/to fine, and to
redeem its notes in legal tender gold coin or in gold bullion
at 65.5 milligrams of gold for one franc, but only at its cen-
tral office and only in such minimum amounts as were agreed
upon by the Minister of Finance and the Bank (Art. 3).
81 Moreau, bc. cit., April 1937, pp.824—46.460 EXPERIMENTATION
Until a date to be specified by decree of the Council of Min-
isters it restricted the right of gold coinage to the Bank of
France (Art. 6). It repealed the Law of November 15,1915
prohibitingthe export of gold and other laws preventing deal-
ings in and melting of gold (Art. 12). It ended the unlimited
legal tender power of silver coins and provided that gold
alone should be legal reserve for the Bank of France (Art. 7
and 4). These provisions legally devalued the franc, ended
the long history of the limping standard in France, and placed
France upon a gold bullion standard. The law, however, was
silent concerning the disposition of the large volume of for-
eign exchange already held or contracted for by the Bank of
France. Because of this remarkable inheritance from the pre-
ceding gold exchange standard, the gold bullion standard now
established in France was unique. No conventional rubric
based solely on the legal arrangements of June 1928 is suffi-
ciently broad to describe fully and accurately the monetary
standard of France after her legal return to gold.
The Law of June 1928 also abolished the time-honored sys-
tem of a legally defined maximum of note issues and substi-
tuted the minimum reserve ratio system, requiring that a
gold reserve ratio of 35 per cent of its combined note and de-
posit liabilities be held by the Bank of France (Art. 4), and
terminated the various arrangements, beginning with that of
December 1920, under which the Treasury accepted deposits
from the public (Art. 1 1).
TheConvention between the Bank of France and the gov-
ernment provided for the revaluation of the gold of the Bank
of France and certain other of its assets and for the application
of the profit to a reduction of the Bank's advances to the
Treasury. The relations between the Bank and the Treasury
were subjected to a thoroughgoing reform summarized by
Mr. Hawtrey as follows:
"Besides the 17,900millionsof advances to the state so designated
in the balance sheet, provision had to be made (i)forthe debt
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the war and handed over to the Bank of England for the purpose
of maintaining the American Exchange; (2) for certain bills dis-






against this had to be set:
Revaluation of gold, etc. 16,431
Treasury Credit Balance 553
Other Funds of the Treasury 4,346
21,330
'The net debt was thus reduced to 3,850 millions. Nevertheless
3eparate provision was made for the Russian Bills, the Caisse
Autonome being made responsible for them. And it was decided
that there should be a permanent statutory advance of 3 milliards
to the state. The result was that the Treasury acquired a credit
balance of 5,080 millions. Along with the sinking fund balance
of 1,934 millions the public deposits at the Bank of France thus
amounted to 7 milliards." 82
TheConvention between the government and the Bank
also ended the long established system of temporary advances
to the state by the Bank under a legal maximum, for it pro-
vided, in Article 8, that the account of temporary advances
of the Bank to the government and. the account of French
treasury bonds discounted for advances of the French govern-
ment ito foreign governments should be 'finally closed' upon
the ratification of the Convention.
Finally, this Convention gave the Bank of France power to
purchase bills and short term securities for the account of
such foreign banks of issue as had opened current accounts
82Op. cit., p.21. These arrangements were all provided for in Art. 1—5and
of the Convention between the government and the Bank. Art. 6 and io
were part of the series of arrangements that provided for the disposition of
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with it, to guarantee such bills and securities, and to redis-
count them (Art. 9). It thus opened the way for the French
side of inter-central bank cooperation in the stabilization of
the exchanges by allowing foreign central bank operations in
the French market similar to those conducted by the Bank
of France in London and New York and under similar central
bank control. It gave the Bank of France a small measure of
initiative in the open market.
Articles 6 and io of the Convention between the govern-
ment and the Bank of France, the Convention between the
government and the Caisse d'Amortissement, and the Con-
vention between the Bank of France and the Caisse d'Amor-
tissement jointly provided for the exchange of 5,930 million
government bonds held by the Bank, representing advances
to Russia, for non-interest bearing three month bonds of the
Caisse, and for the allocation to the Caisse of designated
revenues for the service of these bonds, including the profits
on silver coinage.
Article 3 of the Convention between the Bank and the
Caisse explicitly granted a further limited open market power
to the Bank. It provided that the Bank should have the right
to sell these bonds in the open market "in order to influence
the volume of credit and to maintain control of its circula-
tion," and to repurchase them before maturity.
The Technical Heritage
These new arrangements had a profound significance for the
subsequent history of the international gold standard. Their
salient features in this respect may be summed up as follows:
i)Thewithdrawal from the Bank of France of the right to
purchase foreign exchange and to issue notes against it placed
the Bank of France in a strategic position with respect to
gold imports. As long as it was possessed of 'excess' gold re-
serves it could purchase foreign exchange and issue notes
against this 'excess gold,' thus producing the same effect as if
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frainfrom such purchases of foreign exchange. If it did so
while the French balance of payment was favorable, large in-
creases would accrue to the foreign exchange holdings of
private French banks, and the effort of these banks to restore
their working balances abroad to their customary relationship
to other assets would strengthen the French exchanges and
lead to gold arbitrage transactions of the ordinary type. By
adopting the purely passive attitude of awaiting the presenta-
tion of gold at its counters and purchasing this gold as re-
quired by law, the Bank of France could, under these cir-
cumstances, accumulate gold on a large scale.
2) Large gold imports could be viewed by France with calm,
if not with satisfaction, for they did not represent grave
danger of inflation. For in France the small use of checks
made possible the absorption of a large amount of gold with
a relatively small pyramiding of the superstructure of bank
credit, and relatively small additions to the internal means of
payment. Gold imports on a large scale would not inaugurate
inflationary forces, which, under a differently organized bank-
ing system, might have tended to check the gold inflow
through their influence on interest rates and prices. If, after
the transition to the gold bullion standard, France continued
to fail to employ permanently abroad that portion of her
international credits available for investment abroad, this
homely and familiar phenomenon of French financial organ-
ization was certain to be raised suddenly to a position of ex-
treme importance in the whole operation of the decentralized
international gold standard system.83
s)Thenew relations between the government and the Bank
of France eliminated from the French economy two sources of
internal deflationary pressure that had been operative during
the period of de facto stabilization. The government no
longer withdrew notes from circulation by accumulating in
its deposits with the Bank of France deposits received by the
Treasury from the public, and it no longer permanently with-
38Cf.Hawti-ey, cit., pp. if.464 EXPERIMENTATION
drew notes from circulation that had been received as part of
its general revenues, by using them to repay advances at the
Bank of France. However, the assignment of special revenues
to the Caisse d'Amortissement was bound to continue to build
up Treasury balances at the Bank of France as long as the
reduction in the floating debt did not proceed pan passu with
the receipt of revenue earmarked for that purpose. This, in
fact, proved to be the case for some months after stabilization.
A technical factor therefore remained in the French money
market well calculated to force French private banks to bring
gold to the Bank of France for the replenishment of their
balances, or looked at from the other point of view, to prevent
gold imports from expanding the circulation.84
4) Furthermore, the peculiar organization of the French sav-
ings bank system produced a 'circuit flow' of notes from the
savings banks to the Caisse de Dépôts and from thence to the
render and to the savings banks again, and a lock-up of notes
held by the Caisse de Dépôts against its liabilities. Both would
increase with an increase in French savings.85
5)If, in spite of the forces tending to minimize the internal
effects of large gold imports into France and the desire of the
Bank of France to strengthen its position, considerations of
an international character should lead the Bank to endeavor
to reduce gold imports, the extreme limitation of its open
market powers deprived it of a major weapon for so doing.
it could not, by open market purchases of securities, offset the
drain upon the note circulation resulting from the accumula-
tion of government deposits and thus eliminate a powerful
motive for gold imports; nor could it by the same means so
reduce interest rates as to encourage foreign borrowers and
discourage foreign lenders and thus lessen the pull of the
franc on the exchanges.
6) The Law of June 25, 1928 was silent concerning the treat-
"Cf. Thomas Balogh, 'The Import of Gold Into France,' Economic Journal,
Sept. iggo, pp. 442—60, especially pp. 448—52.
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mentof the stock of foreign exchange already held by the
Bank of France, but its intent was interpreted as requiring
the Bank to dispose of additions to its foreign exchange hold-
ings accruing after the law was passed through the maturing
of foreign exchange forward contracts. The maturing of these
contracts—amounting to over 9 milliard francs—meant that
immediately following June 1928 part of the French favorable
balance of payments continued to be remitted in the form
of acquisitions by the Bank of France of foreign exchange
against which notes were issued. It prolonged in fact the
technical situation of de facto stabilization. The decision not
to retain these added foreign exchange supplies led subse-
quently to the sale of a part to the government, reducing
government balances at the Bank, but adding to the power of
the Treasury in the foreign exchange markets, and the con-
version of the rest into gold. This conversion was postponed
until the first half of 1929,andbrought France into the world
market for gold at the height of the final phases of the Amer-
ican stock market boom, not because of the then existing com-
position of the French balance of payments, but because of
the technical completion of the transition decreed in June
1928 from the gold exchange to the gold bullion standard.
7) Finally the Law of June 25, 1928 was not interpreted to
mean that the Bank of France could not continue to hold,
including in that phrase the right to replace maturing items,
the foreign exchange actually acquired before that date. This
meant that the French pull over the world's gold supplies
was not compulsorily increased by conversion of pre-stabiliza-
tion as well as post-stabilization acquisitions of foreign ex-
change. On the other hand, no legal compulsion was placed
upon the Bank not to sell its exchange, and as long as it was
held, it gave the Bank of France a great power in London,
New York, and other markets, and a large potential supple-
mentary call upon gold over and above that accruing from
the current favorable balances of French international ac-
counts.CHAPTER i6
The Consolidation of the Gold Standard in Germany,
1924—1928
Like the position of France after the de jure stabilization of
1928, the relation of Germany to the international gold
standard after 1924 cannot be adequately described under
conventional rubrics such as the gold bullion or gold ex-
change standard.
The Four Major Principles of Post-War Stabilization as
Applied to Germany
In Chapter 12 it was shown that the German stabilization
program of 1924 embodied, in addition to the settlement of
past debts, four great principles of post-war stabilization
theory:
1)thedirection of foreign capital to capital-poor countries
2)the adoption of measures of gold economy
g)the determination to safeguard the independence of central
banks
4)the resolve to stop inflation.
The application of these principles to Germany, a world
economic power of the first order, highly industrialized but
denuded of free or working capital and subject to an extraor-
dinary external political debt, was unique in gold standard
history. In the practical test of German life all four principles
changed in meaning and relative importance.
The Principle of Attracting Foreign Capital
The greatest weaknesses of the purely internal German cur-
rency stabilization of the winter of 1923—24 were that it did
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notdirectly provide foreign resources to support the mark or
the means of replenishing the depleted working capital of
Germany. The introduction of the rentenmark was the agency
through which the fact of a shortage of working capital was
first disclosed to business and agriculture. It was followed by
a depression which disclosed the true intensity of the demand
For liquid funds as well as the difficulties of the German bank-
ing system in meeting it. Consequently the Reichsbank was
obliged to meet the first shock of this depression, but the ex-
pansion of its credits threatened to develop into a new in-
Ilationary movement fatal to the stabilization plan. This was
checked by the credit restriction of April 7, 1924, the third
of the great refusals of credit which were the technical basis
for currency stabilization in Germany. In consequence, the
underlying weaknesses of German banks and enterprises, as
disclosed in their new balance sheets, once more made them-
selves felt in renewed depression.1
The great strength of the Dawes Plan, as a stabilization
measure, was that it did attract foreign capital to Germany,
and therefore for the time being solved the German balance
of payments problem, supported the reichsmark, and gave
Germany liquid capital for the development and reorganiza-
tion olE her productive powers. The long run economic sig-
nificance of these capital imports for Germany has been sum-
marized by J. W. Angell at the close of his book, The Recov-
ery of Germany. Writing in 1929, he surveys the history of
the preceding years as if standing in mid-stream of an eco-
nomic process requiring a quarter of a century for its fulfil-
nient, to which the four years of capital imports initiated
under the Dawes Plan were only an introduction. In the
course of his discussion of German foreign trade he says (pp.
355—6):
it is extremely unlikely that a lasting surplus of the neces-
1 Cf. Ch. 12, Political Economics, 1919—1924; also C. T. Schmidt, German Busi-
ness Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934), p. 28; references
in this chapter to German business conditions are largely based on this mono-
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sary size [to meet reparation payments and charges on foreign
capital] can be developed in the near future. A transition period,
of perhaps 20 or evenyears if things move slowly, must inter-
vene. This seems the more probable when one recalls that Ger-
many's exports, and indeed her production in general, are de-
pendent to an unusually high degree on prior imports of raw
materials and foodstuffs. Except at the price of diverting current
production from the domestic markets to exportation, and thus
reducing the domestic standard of living, exports cannot be in-
creased without also increasing imports, though of course in
lesser degree. Nor can imports be reduced without reducing ex-
ports much more than in proportion, except by lowering the
living standard and except with respect to the narrow range of
manufactured goods which fall in the import category. It follows
from this that a sustained absolute increase in the volume of
exportation can bring only a less than proportionate increase in
these exports relative to imports.
In this critical transition period, how can [Germany] make the
large and sustained volume of payments to other countries which
will be necessary?
Clearly she must continue to do what she has been doing since
1924.Bythe sale of securities and tangible property and the ne-
gotiation of short credits abroad, she must obtain in other coun-
tries the funds required to meet all the current foreign obligations
which her own commodity and service exports are inadequate to
offset. Even apart from the need of such capital imports to carry
out her ambitious programs for further internal expansion, there
is no other way in which the international deficit itself can be met.
In other words, during these years Germany's capacity to pay
abroad will be determined largely by her capacity to borrow
abroad, or to secure the necessary funds from foreign countries
in other ways. As time goes on, a steadily larger part of the total
payments will come from her own production and sale of goods
and services, but the critical remainder must be derived from
further importations of capital."
Attraction of foreign capital on this scale and for such pur-
poses was different from the attraction of foreign capital as
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difference in degree, but one so great as to constitute a differ-
ence in kind, for it involved immense economic problems con-
cerning the development of the necessary markets for German
exports and the sources of prolonged and large scale foreign
lending.
Like all capital imports, this inflow into Germany had to be
mediated to the German economy through the German bank-
ing system, and the manner in which it was so mediated pro-
found.ly modified the other principles of stabilization; gold
economy, the independence of the central bank, and the re-
solve to stop inflation.
The Principle of Gold Economy
The legal form of the gold standard adopted by Germany in
October 1924 was that of the gold exchange standard. The
restriction, however, of the proportion of foreign exchange
to gold in the composition of the legal reserve of the Reichs-
bank to one-quarter, and the very strict definition of the
types of foreign assets that could form part of that reserve
indicated that gold exchange was not expected to be perma-
nently of much greater importance in the operations of the
Reichsbank than it had been in pre-war days.2
The obligation to redeem its notes in gold or foreign ex-
change was suspended in the 1924 stabilization and did not
in fact become legally binding until the Young Plan went
into effect in 1930. In practice, however, the Reichsbank did
redeem its notes in gold or foreign exchange upon demand
from 1924 to 1930, but by its own operations it dominated
the foreign exchange market and therefore controlled the
conditions under which the right of redemption was exer-
cised. Germany, in fact, continued, after October 1924 as
before, to be a country with a pegged exchange. As part of
the operation of pegging, the Reichsbank stood ready to buy
and sell foreign exchange at the fixed price of 4.20 reichsmarks
2The average foreign exchange holdings of the Rcichsbank from 1905 to '9's
were about 140 million marks or $33.3 million (Blessing, op. cit., p. 4).470 EXPERIMENTATION
to the dollar until August 23, 1926. Thereafter it bought and
sold at prices determined in part by market fluctuations but
it retained sufficient control to fix the limit of those fluctua-
tions. Dr. Bruins has described the attitude and practice of
the Reichsbank toward the redemption of its notes during
these years:
"As regards delivery of gold, although it was not yet legally bound
to exchange its notes into gold or Devisen, the Reichsbank con-
stantly maintained during this period the standpoint that, if the
development of the rates of exchange should bring about a le-
gitimate demand for gold, it would not hesitate to make it avail-
able. This principle was enunciated several times, inter alia in
the annual report for 1926. As a matter of fact, such gold deliv-
eries never took place as the Reichsbank satisfied the demand for
foreign currencies by delivering Devisen at a price under the gold
export point. Whenever replenishment of the Devisen stock
proved to be necessary, the Reichsbank itself carried out the req-
uisite export of gold to foreign countries. The Bank, for instance,
acted in this way in the spring of 1929andalso during the past
few weeks." 8
Inestablishing this control over the foreign exchange market
the Reichsbank was directly aided by the Dawes Loan which
added to its foreign exchange and enabled it to reconstitute
its gold reserves. Other forms of capital import into Germany
indirectly but powerfully influenced the Reichsbank's posi-
tion in the foreign exchange market and contributed directly
to building up a great volume of bank deposits in Germany.
When after stabilization German business and agricultural
enterprises began to state their balance sheets in terms of gold
marks, many had practically no capital other than their physi-
cal equipment. In order to carry on current operations they
had to borrow either from German banks or abroad. The
lending power of the German banks was, however, very re-
stricted. This was revealed by the reconstitution of their own
C. W. J. Bruins, 'The Movements of Gold into and out of Germany since
1924,'SelectedDocuments of the Gold Delegation (League of Nations, 1931),
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balance sheets. The total assets of 399 private incorporated
banks 'were 31,176 million marks on December 31, 1913, while
on January 1, 1924 the total assets of 500 private incorporated
banks were only 4,044 million reichsmarks.4 Very high inter-
est rates at home were inevitable under such conditions, and
the alternative of borrowing abroad was not open to all bor-
rowers. There was, therefore, a remarkable shrinkage in the
number of business enterprises in Germany during 1924—26.
Many German public bodies and strong enterprises did how-
ever succeed in borrowing abroad under the joint stimulus of
high rates at home, an intense need for capital, and renewed
international confidence in Germany. The successful bor-
rowers were then in a position to purchase goods abroad with
their newly acquired foreign exchange or to bring it to
German banks for reichsmark deposits. The banks themselves
were able to offer high interest inducements to foreign de-
positors, who were attracted to Germany in large numbers—
so large that in 1928 foreign deposits were 45 per cent of the
total d.eposits of all German commercial banks. In addition
the German banks began to arrange new acceptance credits
abroad. for financing German foreign trade, and even, under
the form of reimbursement credits, for the provision of work-
4Maddenand Nadler, international Money Markets (Prentice-Hall, 1935),
p. 364. The principal assets and liabilities of these banks are given in the
Statististhe Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich for 1929asfollows:




Checks and Bills 3,743 227
Due from Banks and Bankers 965 784
Securities 7,320 275
Loans and Current Accounts 10,209 1,360
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ing capital within Germany. From all these sources the Ger-
man banks' holdings of foreign exchange and the deposits of
the borrowers and of foreigners were increased. Part of this
foreign exchange wasretainedas a reserve against foreign
deposits.5 Part was sold to importers whose accounts were
charged, the total effect of the foreign borrowing and the pay-
ment for imports being to offset the deflationary effect of the
latter (cf. Ch. 4).Partof it was sold to the Reichsbank to help
provide for a steady increase in the note circulation from
1924 to 1928, and to build up the reserves of banks as a basis
for new credit extensions. Private borrowing abroad thus
strengthened the reserves of the Reichsbank, but as long as
the central institution continued tp hold the exchange within
gold points, the private banks were in a position to reverse
this process by buying foreign exchange from it when the
reichsmark was weak.
This situation meant that the Reichsbank was brought into
possession of a fund of foreign exchange whose size was a
function first, of the amount of foreign exchange accumu-
lating in the hands of German banks as a whole—that is, of
the German balance of payments; second, of the decision of
these banks concerning the proportion of this total they
wished to hold as working balances abroad. The decision as
to what portion of this fund would be imported into Ger-
many in gold was in the first place a function of the size of
the legal reserve the Reichsbank decided to hold. Up to 1927
this was less than it would have been if the Reichsbank had
decided to convert all its foreign exchange either into gold or
exchange available for cover, for on December 1924 it
held 1 milliard reichsmarks and on December 31, 1925 500
million reichsmarks in foreign exchange outside its legal re-
serve. In the second place, the amount of gold imported was
a function of the proportions in which the Reichsbank wished
to hold gold and foreign exchange in its legal reserve. When
the Reichsbank was rapidly gaining foreign exchange be-
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tween October 1924 and the end of 1926, it pursued a steady
policy of strengthening its reserve and bought just enough
gold to maintain the legal proportion. When in 1927 it was
losing foreign exchange it kept the gold in its reserve and
parted with devisen. When gold began to reach Germany
again in 1928, the previous proportion was not restored. Until
:t928,moreover, all gold imports were made by the Reichs-
bank which was free to choose the market from which they
were to be taken.
The demand of Germany in the world's gold market after
1924 was thus only an indirect reflection of its total balance of
payments position. It was modified as to amount, timing, and
distribution by a series of commercial and central banking
decisions within Germany.
The Principle of the Independent Central Bank
'The inflow of foreign funds into Germany contributed to the
strong position of the Reichsbank in the foreign exchange
market, but only at the cost of weakening its position in the
home market, for it gave German banks a means of access to
centra.l banking credit that was independent of Reichsbank
control. When faced with the choice of borrowing from the
Reichsbank at high rates or borrowing more cheaply abroad
and selling foreign exchange to the Reichsbank, banks and
industrial concerns took the latter alternative. This was espe-
cially true up to August 1926 when no exchange risk was in-
volved in reversing the operation. When foreign markets lost
confidence in Germany and foreign funds were withdrawn
the Reichsbank could make its rate effective by rationing
credit and forcing would-be borrowers to bring to it part of
their foreign exchange; but when foreign funds were flowing
to it the Reichsbank lacked the means of offsetting the result-
ing increase in its credit and thereby making its rate effective.
Its own funds available for operating in the market were
limited, partly because the clearing balances of the commer-
cial banks were smaller than before the war; partly because,474 EXPERIMENTATION
for some years after stabilization, the large public funds of
Germany were not effectively concentrated at the Reichsbank
where their administration could be coordinated with credit
policy;and partly because of the application to Germany of
the Genoa principle of the independent central bank. The
Dawes Plan restricted the advances of the Reichsbank to the
state, and its open market powers in order to protect it from
the demands of the government, but these safeguards also
prevented the accumulation of a portfolio that could be sold
in case of need to tighten the market.
The Principle of Stopping Inflation
Under the Dawes Plan the Reichsbank had been made inde-
pendent of the one influence that in all the immediate post-
war discussions had been considered the single great threat
of inflation—the covering of budget deficits by direct or con-
cealed borrowing from the central bank by government. It
had in consequence been deprived of adequate weapons
against an inflationary influence of an entirely different sort—
the creation of a vast superstructure of bank credit based on
an inflow of foreign funds. This was not the inflationary
threat of the immediate post-war days, but it was not new in
the world's history after 1914. It had been dominant in the
period of war finance itself in many countries, as shown in
Chapters 3 and 6, in which the relation of war-time lending
to the crisis of 1919—20 is suggested. The inflationary enemy
in Germany during 1924—28 was of a similar character, and
the dangers to which it exposed the world economy were
equally great. The inflow of foreign funds into Germany
after 1924, moreover, was a far less simple phenomenon than
the international flow of war-time credits. Its division into
long and short term credits, the unequal intensity of its flow,
its sensitivity to changing psychological attitudes, and the
geographical distribution of its sources all profoundly modi-
fied the influence it had on the German economy. It was re-
6Forthese aspects of the Reichsbank's position, cE. ibid., pp.382—7.COMPLETING THE FACADE 475
lated in a complex way to the periodical efforts of Germany
to mccl: inflationary situations of quite different surface char-
acteristics. These relationships can be brought out by a brief
historical summary of some of its phases.
The Conflict between Control of the Foreign Exchanges
and Control of the Home Market, 1924—1926
C. T. Schmidt has summarized the characteristics of the in-
11GW of capital into Germany in late 1924 and early 1925 in
his German Business Cycles (p. 32):
"During the autumn of 1924 there were reports of contract after
contract for loans and for sales of interests in business organiza-
tions. In addition, a multitude of unrecorded agreements were
concluded and there were considerable sales of securities on the
stock exchange to foreign capitalists. Furthermore, the increased
discounting of bills of exchange and the acceptance of drafts by
bankers in England and the United States added considerably to
German borrowings abroad.
According to the Institut für Konjunkturforschung the total of
foreign :toans extended to Germany by the end of 1924 amounted
to approximately 1,200 million Reichsmarks. Loans during the
fist four months of 1925 more than doubled this total. Although
short-term foreign loans were discouraged by the Reichsbank and
the financial administration, because of the dangers that would
attend their sudden withdrawal, a large volume was extended."
This borrowing was a natural result of the shortage of work-
ing capital in Germany, and the limited capacity of the Ger-
man banking system to extend credit as revealed by the new
balance sheets. In combination with the Reichsbank's own
limited desire and capacity to extend credit, this situation
produced an extraordinary differential between German in-
terest rates and rates abroad. Once confidence was restored
the German banks found themselves in possession of an
extraordinary deposit-attracting power,7 and German public
TIn less degree they possessed such a power before the war when foreign
deposits were regularly placed in Germany to take advantage of relatively
high interest rates. The dangers of this situation were revealed even then in476 EXPERIMENTATION
bodies and private enterprises were given an unusual capacity
to attract foreign investors.
The first large influx of foreign funds relieved the tension
under which the German economy had been laboring. The
Reichsbank credit restriction policy was gradually relaxed.
Deposits were built up at the commercial banks and loans
became available for longer terms. Savings deposits began to
accumulate. Stock exchange prices, which had been depressed
after stabilization, rose, and the indexes of production and
trade increased during the autumn of 1924 and the spring of
1925. Exports were increased,8 but with reviving industry im-
ports were increased more than in proportion and the trade
balance was unfavorable. Unemployment was considerably
reduced.
Foreign loans to Germany continued large throughout
1925, but after the initial inward movement many were issued
to refund earlier short term advances. New foreign funds
therefore declined in volume. The effect upon the German
economy is thus described by Mr. Schmidt (pp. 36—7)
when foreign advances declined, or amounted largely to
conversions of previous loans, German borrowers were unable to
turn to supplies of domestic capital. The issue of stocks in the
face of a weakened stock market was difficult, and the demand
for bonds was so slight in 1925asalso to make their flotation in-
advisable.
Enterprises that needed credit, therefore, had to resort to short
term borrowing. Demands for funds overwhelmed the banks. The
desire to preserve liquidity caused them to turn down fresh de-
mands for money and even to call older loans, especially smaller
advances. Banking policy wasrathermore lenient with larger
debtors than with smaller. A restriction of credit advances to
the larger organizations would at once have resulted in the aban-
donment of large projects and the dismissal of many workers.
time of crisis; for example, when imilliardFrench francs were withdrawn
from Berlin during the Morocco crisis of 1911.
S MacmillanReport wasofthe opinion that the mark was slightly under-
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Credit retrenchment, then, was made possible by recalling me-
dium and small loans.
In the autumn of 1925, since it was almost impossible for in-
dustrial and commercial organizations to consolidate debts, they
had to seek short term loans from the credit banks. As it became
more and more apparent that repayment would be difficult, the
banks, afraid of frozen credits, pressed for settlement and re-
stricted further loans. This, of course, made the situation all the
more tense."
During this depression, which reached its lowest point in
February 1926 and was marked by declining production, in-
creased unemployment, more business failures, and a check
to the decline in interest rates, Germany turned to rationali-
zation of industry and to an effort to make herself more nearly
self-sufficient in agriculture. Imports of raw materials and
semi-manufactured goods were reduced, but even so the trade
balance continued unfavorable. A breakdown of the Dawes
Plan seemed probable. Dr. Bruening, in his summary of his
Lowell Institute Lectures, delivered in Boston in the winter
of 1q35—36, paints the picture of this period:
"By intensification of agriculture with the help of science [Ger-
many] cut down imports to the detriment of countries living
largely on their agricultural exports. At the same time industry
was modernized, huge combines were founded to foster German
industrial exports, and so by a surplus in the German balance
of payments to be able to meet the reparation transfer. But these
gigantic efforts led only to a very gloomy outlook in 1926. It
looked as if the inevitable crisis in Reparations, at least as regards
their transfer into foreign currencies, was bound to come only
two years after the start of the Dawes Plan."
Relief from these economic stresses came in 1926 through
a remarkable combination of events which was of first im-
portance in determining Germany's relations to the inter-
national gold standard system, and therefore in determining
its whole subsequent history. German internal recovery was
promoted by the reorganization of industry which eliminated478 EXPERIMENTATION
most of the weak business units left over from the inflation.
The factors leading to recovery usually present at the turn of
a business cycle were also at work, and the internal credit posi-
tion was eased somewhat by the final termination of the
Reichsbank's credit-rationing policy in December 1925, and
by a vigorous effort jo fund short term internal credits, in
which the aid of the Gold Discount Bank was enlisted.9 The
two factors mentioned by Dr. Bruening helped to turn an
unfavorable into a favorable trade balance, and in this Ger-
many was aided by French de facto stabilization which ended
the long continued progressive depreciation of the franc.
Far more important, both for the development of the
German economy and the support of the exchanges, than any
of these factors were two dominating external influences—
the British coal strike and the resumption of the inflow of
foreign capital. It is difficult to exaggerate the effect of the
British coal strike upon Germany. It led to new employment
and optimism and gave the impetus for an extremely rapid
acceleration of rationalization throughout German industry.
In the coal fields old pits were closed and new ones opened
with the newest machinery. The iron and steel industry
profited directly and the feeling that enduring prosperity
was finally within reach spread to all industry. The new and
sustained outburst of activity obscured the fact that the pros-
perity was promoted by temporary causes and that the tre-
mendous pace of rationalization was producing technological
unemployment which increased production costs by raising
local taxes at the same time that they were steadily being in-
creased by the high cost of the borrowed money with which
rationalization was financed. The industrial recovery en-
couraged optimistic views of public finance which ultimately
led to increases in the salaries of civil servants to match in-
creases in trade union wages granted by industry.
9The Gold Discount Bank in1926 borrowedshort term funds and bought 7
per cent agricultural mortgage notes of the Deutsche Renteri Kreditanstalt;
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The renewed inflow of foreign funds, which largely fi-
nanced the accelerated rationalization, was itself the second
major element in the German recovery. It gave the first im-
pulse to the recovery from the depression of the winter of
1925—26. It made possible the funding of German debts and
lightened the burden of German banks. It helped to reduce
interest rates. The average rate for three months money in
Germany for the entire year i 925, as given by Madden and
Nadler, was per cent and for 1926, 6.58 per cent, while
t:he differential between German and foreign rates was 5.39
per cent in 1925 and 2.65 per cent in 1926. Domestic and for-
eign demand for German securities increased and stock mar-
ket prices rose, and the capacity of the market to absorb new
issues increased, though long term interest rates still remained
relatively high.
For reasons already given the inflow of foreign funds, which
produced this expansion of credit within Germany, left the
]Eteichsbank technically out of touch with the market. The
discount rate became ineffective as a weapon of credit control
and the Reichsbank become aware that the true enemy to its
independence was no longer the German government, but the
dependence of Germany upon foreign capital for her eco-
nomic development. In August 1926 it tried to regain part of
its independence by ending the formal pegging of the mark
so as to introduce an element of exchange risk into the opera-
lion whereby it was used as an agent in credit operations in
which foreign lenders and German banks and industries were
the pr:incipals, but this was not enough to restore its control
over the domestic market.
From 1924 to 1926 therefore the Reichsbank found it diffi-
cult to reconcile its duty to control the foreign exchanges, to
which it was bound by the Dawes Plan and to guarantee the
l)erforflance of which it was subjected to foreign supervision,
and its duty to control the domestic market, to which it was
impelled by all the considerations of banking policy and long480 EXPERIMENTATION
run economic responsibility that underlie the institution of
central banking itself.
The Retreat from the Principle of Stopping Inflation,
1927—1928
During the first six months of 1927 German economic re-
covery became more and more widespread, but the inflow of
long term capital from abroad was sharply restricted. This
was partly due to the concentration of French funds seeking
employment abroad in the hands of the Bank of France and
their utilization in substantial amounts to repay credits in
England and to buy gold. This diminished one potential
source of long term capital imports into Germany. At the
same time some restraint was exercised by prospective Ger-
man borrowers abroad because the non-productive use of the
proceeds of some of Germany's foreign loans and the growth
of public expenditures were causing uneasiness in Germany.
•The main reason, however, was that it was becoming easier
to borrow at home. The domestic capital market was reviving,
and this revival was actively encouraged by the authorities.
From December 1926 to June 1927 the exemption of German
securities placed abroad from the prevailing io per cent tax
on the yield of capital was withdrawn, and on January ii,
1927 the Reichsbank reduced its discount rate from 6 to 5
per cent in harmony with generally easier money rates in
Germany.'°
The improvement in the domestic capital market became
pronounced in the spring of 1927 and had a rather compli-
cated effect on the German balance of payments. While long
term foreign borrowing was curtailed, foreign short term
funds were attracted to Germany for speculative employment
on the Bourse, and there was also a counter movement of
short term funds outward on account of the fall in the interest
10Cf.League of Nations, Course and Phases of the World Economic
sian, prepared by Bertil Ohlin (rev. ed., Geneva, 1931),pp. alsoR. R.
Kuczenski, 'American Loans to Germany,' Foreign Investments (Harris Foun-
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differential. German money was seeking employment in Lon-
don and Paris early in 1927, and German investments abroad
were increasing. The net movement seems to have been away
from Germany. At the same time the balance of trade became
adverse because of increased imports incident to the rising
activity of business. The reichsmark was consequently weak
and was prevented from reaching gold export point only by
large offers of foreign exchange from the Reichsbank's port-
folio.
The Reichsbank did not allow these losses of devisen to
have their full deflationary effects within Germany, but offset
them by increasing its bill portfolio,1' so that the speculative
activity first financed by foreign funds was carried on by
domestic credit expansion. This was an important but tem-
porary phase in the progress of inflation in Germany. The
outward movement of capital was not wholly without in-
fluence upon the German market. Combined with a con-
tinued domestic demand for capital,it soon reversed the
downward trend in interest rates, and this in turn called
forth a fresh inward movement of short term funds. At the
same time speculative opportunities on the stock exchange
attracted foreign purchasers of German securities. The boom
conditions increased the danger of later sudden withdrawals
of foreign investments and through their general influence on
prices threatened to react unfavorably on the trade balance.
The old dilemma of the Reichsbank, set forth in the preced-
ing section, had to be faced in an acute form. Being unable
to check speculation by drastic rate increases without further
attracting foreign capital, the Reichsbank, in May 1927,
brought about a sharp reaction in security prices by forcing
the banks, by drastic credit restriction, to reduce their loans
to the Bourse.'2
11 Report of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, June7, 1928, pp.
69—7o; cf. Schmidt, op. cit., p.
12 Madden and Nadler attribute this action to more long run considerations,
namely to a desire "to curtail stock exchange speculation and to prevent a
rise in prices which would cause reduced exports and increased imports and482 EXPERIMENTATION
Neither the temporary reduction in the inflow of foreign
funds nor the subsequent check to speculation on the Bourse
seriously interrupted the development of the general move-
ment of rationalization and industrial expansion in Germany.
The demands of private borrowers and continued borrowings
by public bodies still required more capital than the German
market could supply. Interest rates continued high and con-
ditions were still favorable for a revival of long term foreign
borrowings and a continuation of the inflow of short term
foreign funds.
This was a turning point for German finance, and therefore
for the international gold standard system. The economic
alternatives to the building up in Germany of an ever in-
creasing credit superstructure upon an increasing but ever
less solid foundation of borrowed capital were first, to stop
the inflow of foreign credits both long and short, and second
to fund a substantial portion of the short term credit already
in existence. If the spurious prosperity induced by the opti-
mistic view of the possibilities of rationalization following the
British coal strike had not taken so deep a hold on the imag-
ination of the German people, or if the Reichsbank had not
offset in large part the deflationary effect of its losses of for-
eign exchange, it is possible that the crisis of 1927 might have
forced a suspension of reparation payments under the trans-
fer protection provided by the Dawes Plan. The actual course
of events was that foreign capital began to flow into Germany
again early in the summer of 1927. Abundant supplies of for-
eign exchange were offered to the Reichsbank, and there
was no crisis in the Dawes Plan. In the light of subsequent
events the fact that a major reparation crisis was not allowed
to develop at this time must be regarded as a catastrophe.
During the first six months of 1927 credit in Germany, as
measured by new capital issues and private bank deposits,
actually increased rapidly. After a long delay, attributable to
pressure on the foreign exchange of the Reichsbank" (op. cit., p. 385) ;ci.
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its unwillingness further to encourage the inflow of foreign
funds, the Reichsbank finally raised its rate from 5 to 6 per
cent on June 7, 1927 and on October 4, 1927 to 7 per cent.
These increases, however, did not influence credits in general,
which continued to expand throughout 1927 and the first half
1928. During the latter part of this period Reichsbank
credit was made available to the banks in the form of pay-
ments for gold and devisen, rather than through increases in
the Reichsbank's portfolio of bills. Until the spring of 1928,
when there was a recession to about the levels of early 1927,
business in Germany, in the words of the Agent General for
Reparation Payments, continued to display an activity "en-
tirely characteristic of a period when large supplies of fresh
funds were available for production and consumption." 18
On October 20, 1927 the Agent General for Reparation
Payments addressed a note to the Reich government corn-
;plainin.g that the rising tide of public expenditure was giving
an artificial stimulus to economic life and threatened to
undermine the essential stability of the public finances. The
efforts of the Reich to remedy this situation took various
forms, chief among them intervention to control the foreign
borrowings of states and communes. Such borrowing had,
1.924, been subject to the approval of the Beratungstelle
and in. October 1927 that office suspended its activities until
it could review its policy. Not until May 1928 did it again
approve applications for foreign loans, and then only in ac-
cordartce with a carefully worked out general plan. Publicly
controlled enterprises, however, still had access to foreign
markets and no steps were taken by the Reich to curtail the
foreign borrowing of German private industry and commerce.
The short term foreign debt was larger in May 1928 than in
])ecember 1927, and more foreign loans were placed between
these two dates than in any previous corresponding period.
18 Repolt of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, Dec. 10,1927, p.92.
Thisdescription applied to the end of 1927, but remained apt for the begin-
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The conclusion to be drawn from this record is inescapable.
In 1927 and 1928 the stabilization principle of stopping in-
flation was applied in Germany in so intermittent and half-
hearted a way as to constitute a retreat from the principle it-
self.
The Approach of the Acid Test of the Principle of
Attracting Foreign Capital, 1928
In 1928 the maximum Dawes Plan annuity of 21,4milliard
reichsmarks was to go into effect, and with it the machin-
ery of the Prosperity Index. This meant not only that an in-
creased annual burden of 750 million reichsmarks would fall
upon the German budget, already in a precarious position,
but also that the surface prosperity of Germany would prob-
ably carry the Prosperity Index to a point where even greater
payments would have to be made. Even under boom condi-
tions such an increase in payments might have led to a break-
down in the Plan, or at least of its transfer possibilities.
These circumstances added great weight to the arguments
advanced in his Reports by the Agent General for Reparation
Payments in favor of a final agreement upon the total of repa-
ration. If compensated for by putting the annuities in a form
suitable for commercialization, some reduction in the an-
nuities of the immediate future began to appeal to the credi-
tors as possibly in their own interest. At the same time the
German government was pressing for rapid evacuation of the
Rhineland, and in August 1928 it was made clear to Strese-
mann by the French that the whole question of evacuation
was inextricably bound up with reparation.
Both Germany and her creditors had strong reasons in 1928
to desire the negotiation of a final settlement. The general
optimism of the time made it seem safe to envisage the drop-
ping of transfer protection, especially if annual payments
were to be reduced. The dropping of transfer protection, in
fact, seemed to have certain positive advantages to the credi-
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tectionfreed German officials from some of the consequences
of their own acts while uncertainty concerning the total of
the reparation to be paid removed the incentive to financial
reform.
The general optimism also kept alive the conviction that
Germany would eventually develop, with the aid of foreign
borrowing, export surpluses sufficient to provide real and ul-
timate payment of reparation. This assumption was one of the
greatest of all post-war illusions. In the summer of 1928the
first unmistakable signs of a new economic depression were
beginning to appear in Germany,'4 and, though foreign loans
continued, the sources of the inward movement of capital
'were actually beginning to dry up.'5 In addition, the most
glaring weakness of Germany's international position—her
continued large short term indebtedness—had not been rem-
edied.
The inflow of acceptance credits had come largely from
and the temptation to use them more and more to
working capital had been strong, and had not been
resisted. The advances obtained from American banks had
been largely in the form of deposits and other short term
credits to German banks, and these had been reinvested by
the German banks in long term commitments, including even
municipal housing and similar projects. The dangers were
obvious, and there is reason to believe that both English and
American bankers and German borrowers were willing and
even anxious to put part of these credits in funded form as
early as the summer of 1927. Had credits then been refunded
on a large scale the first shock of the withdrawal of foreign
funds in later crises would have been much less. Purely eco-
nomic considerations, however, militated against large scale
refunding at a moment of exceptionally high interest rates,
and in addition strong political motives prevented effective
14 Schmidt, op. cit.,pp.47—8;cf. also Ch. 25,TheAcid Test of the Stabiliza-
tion Principle of Attracting Foreign Capital.
15 Cf. Ch. 22, The End of De Facto Cooperation by the Nudeus.486 EXPERIMENTATION
action in this field. The possibility that a future withdrawal
of short term foreign funds might precipitate a crisis in the
Dawes Plan and lead to a genuine solution of the reparation
problem without any violation by Germany of the provisions
of the Plan was distinctly attractive to some minds in Ger-
many. The cooperation of the tax experts of all parties in the
Reichstag in levying even unpopular taxes in order to make
sure that a Dawes Plan crisis, if it developed, should not be
laid to the door of Germany is to be explained on this ground.
It was therefore with all danger signals flying that Ger-
many, in 1928, approached the acid test of the stabilization
principle of attracting foreign capital.
Modification of the Principle of Gold Economy, 1928
In 1928, also, Germany completed, in the main, a transition
from the gold exchange to the gold bullion standard. The
various steps in this transition were technically significant in
the development of the mutual relations of the center coun-
tries, Great Britain, France, and the United States. The final
result had an important bearing on the relation of Germany
to the whole international gold standard system in the last
years of Experimentation.
As long as the exchange was pegged at 4.20 reichsmarks to
the dollar, the recurring autumn weakness of sterling in New
York had to be reflected in weakness of sterling in Berlin also,
but when the Reichsbank bought gold abroad, it did not buy
it in London.'° With the abandonment of pegging on August
23, 1926 this diversion of German purchases of gold from the
London market ended. When, in November 1926, sterling
approached the gold export point to Germany the Reichsbank
even encouraged a gold arbitrage movement from London
by accepting gold in Bremen as well as in Berlin. Further-
more, when the reichsmark was weak early in 1927 the Reichs-
bank gave up not gold but foreign exchange. The reduction
in its devisen portfolio at that time was about one milliard
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:reichs:rnarks. Of this half came from holdings of foreign ex-
change not counted as part of the bank's legal reserve.'7 This
meant that the policy, closely adhered to when the Reichs-
bank's reserves were being built up, of maintaining the for-
eign exchange reserve at one-quarter of total legal reserves,
was abandoned.
The renewed inflow of foreign capital in the summer of
1927 produced a great change in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. The reichsmark rapidly gained strength and it looked as
if Germany might again appear as a buyer in the London
gold market. This, however, did not happen for over a year,
largely because of the international conference of central
in New York in June 1927,18atwhich Germany was
represented. At that conference questions bearing upon the
relending to Germany of reparation payments, later elabo-
rated aspartof the plans for the Bank for International Set-
tlements,'° were discussed. Of more immediate importance to
Germany was the decision to facilitate the redistribution of
gold by diverting demand from London to New York. The
adoption of a cheap money policy in America to promote this
redistribution was an important factor in encouraging the
flotation of German securities in New York and thereby
strengthening the reichsmark in terms of dollars. Specifically,
Germany's adherence to the program of protecting the Lon-
don gold market was made manifest by a change In attitude,
as compared to the autumn of 1926, toward gold arbitrage
shipments. In his Report for December 1927 the Agent Gen-
eral for Reparation Payments wrote (p. 95):
ll:The decline of the dollar (from August, 1927, on) while it did
riot reach the point at which it would be profitable to buy gold
in New York and bring it to Germany, did approach a point at
which it would pay to convert dollars into sterling, buy gold in
1YBruins,op. cit., p.iS.
Cf.Cb. 15,TheMoreau-Norman Conversations of May 1927,andCh. i8,
The Critical Decisions of 1927intheir Inflationary Setting.
'°E.L. Dulles, The Bank for International Settlements at Work (Macmillan,
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London, and bring gold to Germany. That no such transactions
took place in any substantial sums was owing mainly to the fact
that on October iS the Reichsbank lowered its buying rate for
gold from the statutory mint equivalent of 2,790 Reichsmarks
per kilo of fine gold to 2,784 Reichsmarks, the lowest point at
which it is legally qualified to buy gold."
Thereafter German demand for gold was diverted from Lon-
don by the relatively greater strength of the reichsmark in
dollars than in sterling, which was itself a byproduct of the
international consultations of 1927, for it reflected the im-
provement of the sterling exchange in New York.
As a result of careful currency management Germany suc-
ceeded in remaining neutral in the gold markets of the world
during 1927. Not until 1928, after it had been remarkably
stationary for a year, did the gold stock of the Reichsbank
begin to increase. It then appeared that the Reichsbank had
once more changed its attitude. It allowed exchange rates to
reach the gold import point, so that from then on gold began
to reach it through the channels of gold arbitrage carried out
by private banks.2° Because of the faithfulness with which the
Berlin exchange reflected the changing relations between the
dollar and the pound,2' the fact that Germany was buying
gold in the cheapest market on ordinary gold standard prin-
ciples, proved to be of great international significance. In the
first half of 1928 Germany drew gold from New York, but
with the weakening of sterling in the summer the position of
the two airrencies in Berlin was reversed. By that time Lon-
don was no longer protected by an international gold redis-
tribution policy, and a steady drain of gold from London to
Germany became the most outstanding feature of the bullion
market during the last six months of 1928.22 During this pe-
riod, however, French gold imports were suspended, for the
20 Bruins, op. cit., p. i6.
21 This is admirably brought out in the charts opposite p. 20ofDr. Bruins'
report which is so freely drawn upon in this summary.
22 Samuel Montagu & Co., Annual Bullion Letter, 1928, p. 6.COMPLETING THE FACADE 489
Bankof France was building up its foreign exchange balances
by the maturing of forward contracts(cf. Ch. 15). At no
time, therefore, before 1929, was the London bullion market
subject to a simultaneous effective demand for gold from
both France and Germany.23
The import of gold into Germany through gold arbitrage
in 1928 also meant that the legal reserve of the Reichsbank
was not restored to its former composition of one-fourth for-
eign exchange and three-fourths gold, and that the Reichs-
bank did not accumulate large non-reserve holdings of
devisen. It meant, therefore, that the next unfavorable con-
juncture in the international position of Germany would be
reflected visibly in a reduction of the Reichsbank's gold re-
serves. This was in accord with views expressed by Dr. Schacht
in October 1926, but not reflected in Reichsbank policy in
1927, to the effect that gold exports, as compared with the
delivery of devisen in the exchange market, have the advan-
tage of revealing more clearly to the business community the
dangers connected with the attainment of the gold point,24
and that devisen represent a double utilization of credit and
expose the central bank to a risk abroad as well as to the risk
of its inland credits.
By the time the negotiations for a permanent solution of
the reparation problem were begun in 1928, Germany had
abandoned the stabilization principle of gold economy so far
as that principle was represented by the gold exchange stand-
ard.
28Forthe importance for Great Britain, cf. Ch. 19,BankRate and the Defense
of Sterling.
24Ch.io, Establishment of an Apprehension Point.